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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that Jane is a soldier who just received an order to abuse 
prisoners, as in the case of Abu Ghraib, Iraq;1 to kill innocent civilian 
villagers, as in the case of My Lai, Vietnam;2 or to participate in the 
persecution and extermination of an ethnic group, as in the case of the 
Holocaust.3  While we can argue over the specific details of the law that 
should govern the extent to which soldiers have a duty to obey their 
commanders’ orders, can anyone argue that the law should instruct a soldier 
like Jane to obey orders in any of those three situations?  Can anyone truly 
argue that a soldier like Jane should not be expected to know that such orders 
are illegal?  Furthermore, let us assume that Jane obeys the order, she is put 
on trial, and she raises the superior orders defense; a criminal law defense 
that allows a subordinate to avoid culpability for an illegal act committed 
under orders.  Setting aside the question of if and when subordinates should 
be allowed to raise this defense, does anybody truly think a soldier like Jane 
should be sheltered from punishment by claiming obedience to orders? 
Let us now consider the case of another soldier, Sue, who is a supply 
sergeant.  Her commander gives her an order to supply certain ammunitions 
to a battalion in the field.  Sue has doubts as to whether the ammunitions she 
is instructed to supply in massive quantities are legal according to the law of 
war, but she has no time to clarify the issue.4  If Sue is right, and the order is 
                                                                                                                                                       
 1 E.g., United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316, 318 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (describing an order to 
use unmuzzled military working dogs as a scare tactic during interrogations). 
 2 E.g., United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 538 (C.M.A. 1973) (describing an order 
“to kill every living thing — men, women, children . . . and under no circumstances . . . leave 
any Vietnamese behind”). 
 3 E.g., UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR 
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAWS OF WAR 287 (1948) (noting that most 
defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg pleaded not guilty on 
grounds of superior orders).  
 4 Such a situation can occur not only due to a “simple” case of legal ignorance or a 
commander’s malice, but confusion may be caused by an array of other reasons such as: (1) 
There are several weapons that are clearly permitted during law enforcement activities and are 
clearly forbidden during combat, such as tear gas and expanding bullets.  Armed forces, 
however, often engage in both kinds of activities.  1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUIS 
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 265, 270 (2005).  
Thus, a soldier might be confused as to when and where certain ammunitions can be used.  (2) 
Many of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) rules dealing with means of warfare are 
extremely technical and without any governing rationale, which may lead to confusion.  For 
example, international law prohibits the manufacturing of booby-traps that look like harmless 
portable objects (e.g., making a bomb that looks like a camera) but allows attaching booby-
traps to existing harmless portable objects (e.g., attaching a bomb to a camera).  Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II) 
(As Amended on May 3, 1996), art. 6, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, entered into force 
Dec. 3, 1998; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
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illegal, then obeying it will enable the commission of a war crime on a 
massive scale.  If Sue is wrong, and the order is legal, a legitimate military 
attack might fail due to her mistaken refusal to supply the ammunitions.  
When should Sue be punished for such obedience, if the order turns out to be 
in violation of the law of war? 
Lastly, consider a third case dealing with domestic law.  Jill is an airplane 
mechanic in the Air Force.  Her commander gives her the order to do a quick 
fix on an airplane engine.  Jill vaguely recalls that Air Force regulations 
forbid the kind of procedure she has been instructed to perform for safety 
reasons, but she has no time to check the governing regulations.  If Jill is 
right that the order is illegal and obeys it anyway, the airplane might crash 
and soldiers might die.  If Jill is wrong and disobeys the order that is legal 
and safe, an important military operation will be unnecessarily delayed.  
When should domestic law obligate Jill to obey?  Moreover, if Jill was 
correct in suspecting the order to be illegal and yet decided to obey because 
she was unsure of her assessment, should she be allowed to raise the superior 
orders defense if she is later prosecuted? 
When we think of the superior orders defense, we usually think of cases 
like Jane’s.  But, we should also have in mind cases like Sue’s and Jill’s, as 
well as many others where the illegality and immorality of an order is less 
apparent.  Moreover, in this Article I will argue that by paying more attention 
to cases like Sue’s and Jill’s, we can actually create a law that reduces the 
likelihood of soldiers obeying orders in cases like Jane’s.   
How do we want illegal acts committed under military orders, known as 
crimes of obedience, to be regulated by the law?  Jurists are in wild 
disagreement on this subject and have only been able to agree that the issue 
should be regulated by a “one-rule-fits-all policy” (i.e., the same legal rule 
should be applied regardless of the subordinate’s rank or the kind of military 
activity in which the order is given).5  Moreover, this dispute is not only an 
                                                                                                                                                       
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 65 (2004).  
 5 It is commonly agreed in current legal discourse that there are three main approaches 
dealing with obedience to illegal orders.  The first approach is the “absolute liability” 
approach.  According to this approach, a military order can never serve as a basis for a 
criminal law defense.  The second approach is the “absolute defense” approach.  According to 
this approach, a military order is always a basis for a criminal law defense.  The third 
approach is the “conditional liability” approach.  According to this approach, military orders 
serve as a basis for a criminal law defense as long they are not manifestly unlawful.  E.g., 
Abdul Ghafur Hamid, The Defence of Superior Orders, Manifest Illegality Principle and the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: RESPONSES TO A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 1, 5–7 (Abdul Ghafur 
Hamid ed., 2009); Massimo Scaliotti, Defences Before the International Criminal Court: 
Substantive Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility—Part 1, 1 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 
111, 127–28 (2001).  Notice that each of these three approaches attempt to regulate the issue 
through the use of a “one-rule-fits-all policy.”  This description of the three approaches is 
2012] THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE 5 
academic one; in many legal systems, including international law, judges 
differ in their interpretation of the relevant law on the books, causing 
uncertainty and inconsistency in the applied law.6 
This failure to agree upon a regulating norm is not due to a lack of effort.  
Combatants are the perpetrators of the vast majority of war crimes,7 and they 
often perform such crimes under orders.8  Thus, the superior orders defense 
issue “has long been a critical issue in international criminal law.”9  The law 
pertaining to obedience of orders is also a core issue for any domestic system 
of military criminal law, since obedience to orders is the “cardinal virtue”10 
                                                                                                                                                       
somewhat inaccurate, since jurists vary in the ways they interpret each of the approaches.  
Yet, these different interpretations do not attempt to change the one-rule-fits-all characteristic 
of the approaches.  As such, this common (though somewhat inaccurate) “three approaches 
description” still helps to demonstrate the extensive consensus that currently exists regarding 
the need for a “one-rule-fits-all policy.”  Currently, the option of adopting an approach that 
does not regulate the issue in such a manner is raised only rarely.  See, e.g., DAVID ORMEROD, 
SMITH AND HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 357–58 (12th ed. 2008) (debating the possible English 
adoption of a conditional liability approach when illegal orders are given during combative 
actions and an absolute liability approach when illegal orders are given in non-combat 
situations).  Due to the varying interpretations of these three approaches, for the purpose of 
accuracy in this Article, instead of referring to a single conditional liability approach, I shall 
distinguish between two different conditional liability approaches.  And, instead of referring 
to a single absolute liability approach, I shall distinguish between a reduced sentence approach 
and an equal liability approach.  See infra Part II.A.  Elsewhere, I have presented an even more 
extensive survey of the different approaches that exist (i.e., the different interpretations of the 
three approaches stated above).  Ziv Bohrer, The Superior Orders Defense in Domestic and 
International Law—A Doctrinal and Theoretical Revision 9–16 (June 21, 2012) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author).  Within the limits of this 
Article, I focus on examining the five main approaches of current legal discourse.  Since the 
analysis in this Article shows that the application of any one-rule-fits-all policy is 
inappropriate, it also disproves the other approaches, even though they are not explicitly 
examined.  
 6 See infra Part II.B. 
 7 Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From 
Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 638, 639 (2007) (identifying 
combatants as the primary perpetrators of war crimes). 
 8 Aziz Mohammed, Military Culture, War Crimes, and the Defence of Superior Orders, 5–
7 (Aug. 30, 2008) (Doctoral Thesis in Legal Science, Bond Univ.), available at http://epublica 
tions.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context-theses. 
In armed conflicts, too often there are gross violations of international 
humanitarian law, and atrocities are committed against civilians and members 
of the armed forces alike. . . .  One of the most distinctive features about this 
unimaginable loss of lives is that most deaths have occurred as a result of 
atrocities committed under the disguise of obedience to superior orders. 
Id. 
 9 Hiromi Sato, The Defense of Superior Orders in International Law: Some Implications 
for the Codification of International Criminal Law, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 117, 117 (2009) 
(“The defense of obedience to superior orders has long been a critical issue in international 
criminal law. . . . However, till date, there has been much debate on the legal consequences of 
the above mentioned defense.”). 
 10 MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE LAW OF 
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of the military profession and the “backbone” of any armed force.11  Despite 
this issue being central for both domestic and international law, it has yet to 
be resolved.12  Moreover, in the past decade, this issue has even experienced 
a surge of legal interest.  This is in part due to the United States’ and other 
countries’ prolonged involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan,13 as well as the 
ratification by many states of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), which includes a superior orders defense.14  Sadly, this 
increased discussion has neither resolved the scholarly dispute, nor has it 
reduced uncertainty and inconsistency in the application of the law.15 
Thus, this Article re-examines the issue from a new perspective that 
originates from the field of microeconomics; principal-agent analysis.  This 
analysis demonstrates that the core premise of current legal discourse—
regulation through a one-rule-fits-all policy—is flawed.  Furthermore, the 
principal-agent analysis’ concussions help to formulate, in this Article, a 
model for a new legal policy; one that can better regulate the issue of 
obedience to illegal orders.  
The Article proceeds in the following manner: Part II discusses the 
current approaches to crimes of obedience, all of which are one-rule-fits-all 
policies.  The actual harm caused by the current inability to agree on a policy 
is also discussed, as are the reasons for the legal community’s inability to 
come to a consensus.  Part III offers a new way to assess the public aims 
relevant to regulating crimes of obedience, by applying a principal-agent 
analysis.  This analysis shows how each of the currently suggested policies 
influences subordinates’ and commanders’ behavior.  It further uncovers the 
lawmaker’s gains and harms under each policy.  Doing so enables one to 
compare the different policies—with regard to the extent each is beneficial to 
the lawmaker.  The analysis shows that none of the currently adopted 
policies should be applied in all scenarios (i.e., in different situations, a 
different policy will be the one most beneficial to the lawmaker).  Part IV 
discusses three additional matters that strengthen the conclusion that 
                                                                                                                                                       
WAR 1 (1999). 
 11 Mohammed, supra note 8, at 7.  
 12 See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text; see also Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of 
Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 1944 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 70 (“The problem 
raised by the plea of superior orders is, by general admission, one of great complexity both in 
international and in municipal law.”); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 590 (2011) (reaffirming 
Lauterpacht’s observation). 
 13 See, e.g., Sunita Patel, Superior Orders and Detainee Abuse in Iraq, 2008 N.Z.Y.B. INT’L 
L. 91 (stating that “[t]he recent . . . cases in Iraq have thrown into sharp relief some of the 
uncertainties surrounding the defence” since the mid-twentieth century). 
 14 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 33, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 15 See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.  
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obedience to illegal orders should not be regulated through a one-rule-fits-all 
legal policy.  First, it shows that even if the superior orders defense is viewed 
as an excuse defense, it does not follow that regulation of obedience to 
illegal orders should be done through a blanket application of one legal 
norm.  Second, it argues that, despite differences between international law 
and domestic law, regulation of obedience to illegal orders through a one-
rule-fits-all legal policy is inappropriate in both contexts.  Third, it points to 
an element largely ignored in the current legal discourse—the fact that not all 
laws subject to infringement by a military order are cut from the same cloth.  
This variety, it is argued, serves as a further indication that crimes of 
obedience should not be regulated through the application of a single policy 
across the board.  Part V suggests an alternative to current attempts to 
regulate through a uniform policy.  It proposes that different policies should 
be applied in different circumstances, such that the policies are tailored to 
accommodate the varied situations in which military orders are given.  More 
specifically, based upon the analysis’ conclusions, the main norms of such a 
modular policy are formulated herein for use in international as well as 
domestic law.  These norms are designed with the idea that the law should 
account for: (1) the rank of the subordinate soldier, and (2) whether the order 
was given during an emergency situation.  
II.  THE CORE PREMISE OF THE CURRENT SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE 
DISCOURSE  
A.  The Balancing Test 
Maintaining a military is a necessity for states, as most would be unable 
to protect either the instruments of government or the citizenry without one.16  
A military cannot function efficiently if decisions are made only after 
prolonged discussion between soldiers of different ranks.  Thus, subordinates 
are expected to comply with their superiors’ orders.17  At the same time, we 
                                                                                                                                                       
 16 PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY 
RELATIONS 4 (2003). 
 17 Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Lessons of My Lai, 31 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 73, 88 (1992).  
Moreover, as the court, in the classic case of McCall v. McDowell, stated:  
The first duty of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be neither 
discipline nor efficiency in an army.  If every subordinate officer and soldier 
were at liberty to question the legality of the orders of the commander, and 
obey them or not as they may consider them valid or invalid, the camp would 
be turned into a debating school, where the precious moment for action 
would be wasted in wordy conflicts between the advocates of conflicting 
opinions. 
15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 8673); see also 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, 
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 210 (1984).  Robinson argues against extending a superior orders 
8  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:1  
do not wish the military to use its force in a wrongful manner.  Accordingly, 
the law limits the powers of the military by deeming certain actions illegal.18  
Therefore, when determining the extent to which soldiers should be 
encouraged to obey military orders, we should take into account both the 
benefits of such obedience, as well as the harm that might result if such 
encouragement leads soldiers to help their commanders commit illegal acts.19  
It is important to make this assessment with the understanding that a 
soldier’s knowledge of the law is usually imperfect.20  Thus, the more 
strongly they are encouraged to disobey illegal orders, the more likely it is 
they will mistakenly disobey some legal orders as well.   
Moreover, one should acknowledge that asking a soldier to review the 
legality of her commander’s orders places her in an extremely difficult 
position, given time constraints, the authority the commander has over her, 
and the soldier’s imperfect knowledge of the law.21  Given these factors, if a 
soldier commits an illegal act under orders, we should take into account, not 
only the social harms and benefits resulting from the soldier’s action, but 
also the excusatory considerations that might arise in such a situation.22  
How should these considerations be translated into a legal norm?  Almost 
all jurists believe that this issue should be regulated through a one-rule-fits-
all policy.23  Moreover, there is consensus that such a rule should result from 
balancing the rule of law against interests of military discipline and the 
different excusatory considerations just stated.24  For example, in the leading 
                                                                                                                                                       
defense to subordinates of governmental agencies other than the military because “[t]he 
special social interest in an effective military force, requiring strict discipline and nearly 
unquestioned obedience to orders, is not always applicable to general public service.”  Id.  He 
further states that compared to the military a greater “measure of independent judgment and 
personal reflection” should be encouraged in other governmental agencies.  Id. 
 18 FEAVER, supra note 16, at 4, 93. 
 19 State v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627, 632–33 (1864). 
 20 Matthew R. Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope of the Superior 
Orders Defense, 20 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 153, 248 (2001); Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: 
Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 939, 961 (1998). 
 21 Patrick White, Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders Reconsidered, 79 AUSTL. L.J. 
50, 56 (2005). 
 22 Excusatory considerations can be defined as considerations that do not affect the negative 
characteristics of the act, but support the conclusion that, due to the conditions under which 
the person committed the act, the person should be viewed as less culpable or even not 
culpable at all.  See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 203, 225, 240 (1982) (describing the circumstances that could exculpate 
an actor when they conduct an otherwise criminal act).  
 23 See supra note 5.   
 24 For only a few examples out of the many articles that explicitly use the balancing 
procedure, see, e.g., John H.E. Fried, Book Review, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1088, 1089 (1967) 
(reviewing YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF ‘OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’ IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965)); Robert Cryer, Superior Orders and the International Criminal 
Court, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 49, 55 (Richard Burchill et al. eds., 
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American case on the subject,25 Judge Duncan supported a particular rule by 
stating: 
[It] properly balances punishment for the obedience of an 
obviously illegal order against protection to an accused for 
following his elementary duty of obeying his superiors.  Such a 
test reinforces the need for obedience as an essential element of 
military discipline by broadly protecting the soldier who has 
been effectively trained to look to his superiors for direction.  It 
also promotes fairness by permitting the military jury to 
consider the particular accused’s intelligence, grade, training, 
and other elements directly related to the issue of whether he 
should have known an order was illegal.26 
Moreover this “balancing procedure” is used not only in the context of 
domestic law, but also in the context of the international law on the subject.27  
For example, Matthew Lippman has presented the issue in the following 
manner: 
The superior orders defense presents the perennial and 
persistent problem of legal regulation over the military 
management of armed conflict. Military organizations require 
the expeditious and unquestioning implementation of policy 
directives and subordinates are trained to conform and to 
comply with superior orders.  On the other hand, there are 
permissible parameters on the pursuit of warfare.  The 
implementation of commands which contravene these 
constraints poses a threat to innocents and may spark a spiral of 
savagery.  Legally limiting the obligation of subordinates to 
adhere to superior orders, however, places combatants in the 
precarious position of being compelled to choose between 
patriotism and possible international criminal culpability.  This 
also assumes that the law of war is sufficiently clear and 
                                                                                                                                                       
2005); Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in 1 INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 223, 225 (M.C. Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); Mark W.S. Hobel, Note, “So Vast 
an Area of Legal Irresponsibility”? The Superior Orders Defense and Good Faith Reliance on 
Advice of Counsel, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 574, 596 (2011).  It should be noted that, sometimes, 
the balancing procedure is only implicitly referenced; jurists state the public aims they claim 
should be taken into account and then argue one or another approach properly takes into 
account these aims.  
 25 United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973) (deciding a case arising out of the 
massacre at My Lai). 
 26 Id. at 32 (Duncan, J., concurring). 
 27 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.  
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concise to be comprehended by both high-echelon and lower-
ranking combatants functioning within the fast-moving field of 
combat.  High-ranking officers and commanders undoubtedly 
are better positioned than subordinate soldiers to adjudge the 
legality of orders by reason of education, experience, expertise, 
information and perspective.  The jurisprudence of the superior 
orders defense is an exercise in balancing these competing 
considerations.28 
However, what is the content of this one-rule-fits-all policy? 
Interestingly, jurists reach very different conclusions regarding the rule that 
achieves the proper balance of the considerations stated above.  Currently, 
five approaches are generally recognized.  
In order to illustrate the varying implications of these approaches, I shall 
apply each of them to a single case, showing how the fate of a soldier 
changes considerably depending on the approach applied.  The case analyzed 
is one where a subordinate soldier is given an order from her commander to 
commit the war crime of fighting while wearing enemy uniforms.29  Let us 
now apply the different policy approaches to this case. 
The first approach, the “equal liability approach,” punishes both 
commander and subordinate equally; whether a subordinate was obeying an 
order is irrelevant.30  Accordingly, in the enemy uniforms case, both the 
commander and the subordinate would be equally punished.   
The second approach, the “reduced sentence approach,” considers the 
commission of a crime under orders as a mitigating, but not exonerating, 
factor.31  If this approach is applied to the enemy uniforms case the soldier 
will be convicted, but the fact that it was a crime of obedience could mitigate 
her punishment. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 28 Lippman, supra note 20, at 248. 
 29 See, e.g., Trial of Otto Skorzeny and Others, War Crime Comm’n, 9 U.N. Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals 90, 93 (1947) (General Military Government Court of the U.S. 
Zone of Germany) (trying ten German soldiers for obeying an order to wear American 
uniforms).  Currently, Article 8(2)(b)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court forbids “[m]aking improper use . . . of the military insignia and uniform of the 
enemy[,] . . . resulting in death or serious personal injury.”  Rome Statute, supra note 14, 
art. 8(2)(vii). 
 30 See, e.g., In re Greiser, 13 Ann. Dig. 387, 390–91 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland 
1946) (applying the equal liability approach in international law context); United States v. 
Carr, 25 F. Cas. 306, 308 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1872) (No. 14,732) (applying the equal liability 
approach in domestic law).   
 31 See, e.g., A. v. Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, 550 (Austl.); LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 55 (1992) 
(citing Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, art. 8, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 181, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22).  The reduced sentence and the equal liability approaches are usually 
not distinguished, and instead are often referred to jointly as the “absolute liability” approach. 
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The third and fourth approaches both fall within the category of 
“conditional liability approaches.”32  Under a conditional liability approach, 
a superior orders defense should be afforded to a subordinate only under 
limited circumstances, which are usually identified according to the 
“manifest illegality test.”33  According to this test, “[a] person is not 
criminally liable who performs an action commanded by a lawful authority, 
unless the action is manifestly unlawful.”34  However, this test is extremely 
vague, and differences in the interpretation of this test lead to the different 
conditional liability approaches.35  
The first conditional liability approach, the “normative approach,” calls 
for the acquittal of a soldier committing a crime of obedience if the illegal 
act was not grossly immoral.36  Thus, this approach places a high value on 
maintaining military discipline, as a soldier is only under a duty to disobey if 
an order is both illegal and grossly immoral.37  Under this approach, the 
subordinate in the enemy uniforms case would probably be acquitted since 
an order to wear such uniforms, albeit illegal, is not grossly immoral.38 
                                                                                                                                                       
 32 This division is based on Enker’s division in Superior Orders Defense—A Symposium 
Summary, 20 MISHPATIM 591, 598 (1991) (Heb.). 
 33 Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal 
Court versus Customary International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 172, 176 n.7 (1999). 
 34 See, e.g., CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] arts. 122–124 (Fr.), translated in John R. Spencer, 
Criminal Code of the French Republic (2005), http://legislationline.org/documents/section/cri 
minal-codes (demonstrating the manifest illegality test as codified in the French penal code).  
 35 See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (2001) (discussing the fact that this test has been 
interpreted in a number of ways). 
 36 See, e.g., Mil. Appeal 279-283/58 Military Court of Appeals, Ofer v. Chief Military 
Prosecutor, 44 PE 362 (Isr.) translated in Kafr Qassem: A Civilian Massacre, 2 PAL. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 69, 108 (1985) [hereinafter Ofer Military Appeal] (discussing a conditional liability 
approach); see also Montana v. Christopher, 345 F. Supp. 60, 61 (1972) (applying a normative 
approach without referring to the manifest illegality test).  For a discussion of the support for 
this approach in international law, see OSIEL, supra note 10, at 71–90. 
 37 See, e.g., OFFICE OF J. ADVOCATE GEN., U.S. WAR DEP’T, A MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL 355 (1920), available at http://www.babel.hathitrust.org (stating that for a soldier to 
disobey an order of his superior, “the order must be one requiring something to be done which 
is palpably a breach of law and a crime . . . or is of a serious character”); see also Ziv Bohrer, 
Clear and Obvious? A Critical Examination of the Superior Order Defense in Israeli Case 
Law, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 197, 221–22 (2005–2006) (stating that, under the normative 
approach, a soldier can refuse to obey an order only if it is both illegal and grossly immoral). 
 38 See, e.g., 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 4, at 214–15 (“Some practice 
was found that considers the wearing of enemy uniforms as perfidious.  This does not square 
entirely, however, with the definition of perfidy inasmuch as enemy uniforms are not entitled 
to specific protection under humanitarian law, even though the wearing of such uniforms may 
invite the confidence of the enemy . . . .  Other practice considers it a violation of the principle 
of good faith.”).  For examples of illegal orders that most would agree are grossly immoral see 
cases cited supra notes 1–3. 
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According to the second conditional liability approach, the “factual 
approach,” soldiers have a duty to obey only legal orders.  Thus, if a soldier 
obeyed an order when she knew it was illegal, she cannot later raise the 
superior orders defense.  However, an obedient soldier may be acquitted if 
she was reasonably mistaken the order was legal.39  According to this 
approach, if the soldier in the enemy uniforms case knew the order was 
illegal, she would be convicted.  Even if she did not know, she might still be 
convicted if a court rules that a reasonable soldier should have known such 
an order was illegal. 
The fifth approach, the “respondeat superior approach,” places the 
subordinate under an absolute duty to obey all orders, both legal and illegal.  
When a crime of obedience has been committed, the subordinate always 
benefits from the superior orders defense, whereas the commander is held 
responsible.40  As such, the soldier in the enemy uniforms case would be 
acquitted.  The respondeat superior approach lost support following WWII41 
and thus, it is almost never endorsed.42 
                                                                                                                                                       
 39 Hamid, supra note 5, at 5–6; JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, R.C.M. 916(d) (2008) [hereinafter 2008 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL], 
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2008.pdf.  
 40 See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 79 (1925) 
(“Efforts to hold individuals liable before an international tribunal for such acts when 
committed under orders . . . would be destructive of discipline.”); Clyde Eagleton, Editorial 
Comment,  Punishment of War Criminals by the United Nations, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 497 
(1943) (“It is suggested also that the principle respondeat superior be in general 
accepted. . . . [I]t is repugnant to the average person to think of punishing a soldier who, in the 
first place, would be ignorant of the legality or illegality of his act and, in the second place, 
would be shot immediately if he refused to obey the order to perform the illegal act.”). 
 41 See Gary B. Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Application in 
American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2003) (stating that World War II 
and Nuremberg “materially altered the legal position of the soldier who pleaded obedience to 
superior order in defense of his war crimes” and that “society as modernly organized cannot 
tolerate so broad an arch of official irresponsibility” as the one afforded under the respondeat 
superior approach). 
 42 As stated above, in current legal discourse it is commonly stated that there are only three 
main approaches dealing with obedience to illegal orders: “absolute liability,” “absolute 
defense,” and “conditional liability.”  See supra note 5.  Such a description ignores the verity 
of ways in which the term “manifestly unlawful” is interpreted and thus inaccurately assumes 
that only a single conditional liability approach exists.  This description also conflates the 
equal liability and reduced sentence approaches–viewing them as a single “absolute liability” 
approach.  It does so by focusing on a main attribute these approaches share in common–the 
complete rejection of a superior orders defense–and by ignoring the difference that exists 
between these two approaches with regard to issue of sentencing.  As for my use of the term 
“respondeat superior approach” and not “absolute defense approach”: currently, when the 
three-approaches description is used, these two terms are usually viewed as interchangeable.  
Yet, in the past, another approach was advanced that, currently, when the past sources 
supportive of it are not ignored, they are usually conflated with the past sources supportive of 
the “respondeat superior approach.”  This past approach is the “Act of State” approach.  Due 
to the current common disregard to this approach, I chose, within the limits of this Article, not 
2012] THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE 13 
The diversity of outcomes that results from the application of each of 
these approaches indicates that the use of a balancing procedure is flawed. 
Otherwise a consensus as to which approach achieves the most appropriate 
balance should have been developed.  This lack of consensus is a common 
result when jurists attempt to formulate legal policy by balancing abstract 
public interests.43  For example, everyone can agree that maintaining military 
discipline is an aim that should be taken into consideration when determining 
whether a superior orders defense is appropriate.  However, what sort of 
discipline do we envision when we say this, and how much weight should it 
be given?  Is military discipline undermined only when a legal order is 
disobeyed, as supporters of the equal liability approach44 and the reduced 
sentence approach45 argue?  Or is it undermined in all cases in which a 
soldier disobeys an order, even an illegal one, as supporters of the respondeat 
superior approach46 and many supporters of the conditional liability 
approaches47 argue?  
B.  The State of Applied Law 
The state of current applied law (lex lata)48 serves as an additional 
indication that applying either an abstract balancing procedure or a one-rule-
fits-all policy is flawed.  Although jurists in many legal systems claim lex 
lata is consistently applied, it is often the case that different jurists within the 
same legal system disagree on what legal rule is applied.49  This situation 
                                                                                                                                                       
to examine it, nor to discuss the differences between it and the respondeat superior approach.  
 43 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 975 (1987) (noting decisions that reach conflicting conclusions when attempting to 
“strike the unstrikeable balance”). 
 44 E.g., In re Greiser, 13 Ann. Dig. 387, 390–91 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland 
1946). 
 45 E.g., Shlomit Wallerstein, Why English Law Should Not Incorporate the Defence of 
Superior Orders, 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 109, 114, 120 (explaining that soldiers only have a duty 
to obey lawful orders and cannot assume that the duty to obey superiors overrides the law). 
 46 E.g., Wright, supra note 40 (arguing that holding an individual liable for acts committed 
under orders is “destructive of discipline”). 
 47 E.g., sources cited supra note 17. 
 48 A common distinction in legal analysis is between the law as it is (lex lata) and the law 
as it should be (lex ferenda).  WALTER JOHN RAYMOND, DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 281 (7th ed. 
1992).  Another important distinction is between lex lata as it is declared to be by lawmakers 
and courts (and to some extent also by legal scholars), which is commonly referred to as “law 
in books,” and lex lata as it actually is, which is commonly referred to as “law in action.”  
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910).  The current 
section presents different legal sources that declare what lex lata is in order to show that the 
law in action (i.e., the actual lex lata) is uncertain and inconsistent.  
 49 Compare, e.g., JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW – TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 
706 (2006) (“Superior orders has never been recognized as a defence in English and Welsh 
law.”), with Koji Kudo, Command Responsibility and the Defence of Superior Orders 40 (Oct. 
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both indicates that the applied law is in fact inconsistent and uncertain, and 
that the current way in which the issue of obedience to orders is dealt with 
only aggravates this uncertainty.50  
Given that even jurists disagree on what the law is, how can we expect a 
field soldier to immediately recognize which orders she must disobey?  This 
ambiguity leads to unjust consequences for those soldiers who might be 
charged with crimes of obedience, as it violates principles of fair notice.51  
Moreover, the inconsistent application of law within a legal system violates 
the principle of fair treatment under the law because soldiers, committing 
similar crimes, are held to different standards.52  
1.  International Law 
Inconsistent application of the obedience-to-orders law is evident in the 
realm of international law, where extensive disagreement regarding the 
content of the relevant customary international law exists.53  Moreover, 
supporters of each view can point to case law, international documents, and 
statements of various states to support their argument.54  
                                                                                                                                                       
2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Leicester) (“[T]he current position of the UK is 
similar to the manifest illegality principle.”).  In many countries, the law adopts a “manifest 
illegality test,” the adoption of this test rules out the application of approaches other than ones 
of conditional liability.  Yet, adopting this test does not resolve the problems of uncertainty 
and inconsistency.  Often, in such a legal system inconsistency exists in the way the “manifest 
illegality test” is interpreted; i.e., different jurists, within such a legal system, often differ in 
the conditional liability approach that they attribute to this test.  See, e.g., Bohrer, supra note 
37, at 213–19. 
 50 See Patel, supra note 13, at 129 (stating that case law in the U.K., the U.S., and in 
international law “has been erratic and at times inconsistent”); Andreas Zimmermann, 
Superior Orders, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 957, 965 (A. Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (“[T]he leading scholars in the field 
themselves cannot agree as to what the standard should be de lege ferenda and even less what 
it is de lege lata.”); White, supra note 21, at 51, 60 (discussing international, New Zealand’s, 
Australia’s, Canada’s and U.S. law); Bohrer, supra note 37, at 213–19 (discussing uncertainty 
and inconsistency in Israeli law).  
 51 Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 335, 364–67 (2005). 
 52 Id. at 366–67. 
 53 Zimmermann, supra note 50, at 965. 
 54 The following section points to such contradictory sources of international law from 
recent years, but this phenomenon is not new.  For example, post-World War II case law is 
extremely inconsistent on the legal implications of obedience to illegal orders.  Some point out 
this inconsistency and argue that a customary international law has not developed.  E.g., Osiel, 
supra note 20, at 947–48.  Others, however, pick and choose from case law the legal sources 
supportive of their view, claiming that those chosen are the obligatory precedents and 
discounting contradictory sources as non-obligatory (or, alternatively, reinterpreting such 
sources to support their position).  Compare ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 236–40 (2003), and Gaeta, supra note 33, at 183–85 (arguing, based on post-World War 
II case law, that the superior orders defense is not codified in customary international law), 
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This inconsistency is demonstrated by how this issue has been regulated 
in the last two decades.  The international statutes establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rejected the adoption of 
any sort of superior orders defense.55  But, this approach was not 
subsequently adopted by all in the realm of international law.  By the mid-
1990s, a large group of states reached an agreement on a general rule 
regarding crimes of obedience, which was then incorporated into Article 33 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.56  Interestingly, 
unlike in the legal norm decreed for ICTY and ICTR, here a rule that 
explicitly rejects the superior orders defense was not adopted.  Article 33 
states that obedience to orders will not relieve a person of criminal 
responsibility unless she “did not know that the order was unlawful,” and 
“the order was not manifestly unlawful.”57  However, despite its adoption by 
many states, Article 33 also did not resolve legal uncertainty.  
First, Article 33 has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some interpret 
this rule as supportive of the factual approach.58  Some argue that almost all 
orders to commit war crimes are manifestly unlawful, and therefore Article 
33, despite its phrasing appearing to support the factual approach,59 truly 
espouses a reduced sentence or equal liability approach.60  A third group 
argues that not all orders to commit war crimes are manifestly unlawful and, 
since only grossly immoral orders are of sufficient gravity to support war 
crime prosecutions, Article 33 actually supports a normative approach.61  
Furthermore, the adoption of Article 33 did not prevent inconsistency in 
the practices of international and internationalized tribunals.  Despite Article 
33’s adoption of a phrasing that allows for the application of a conditional 
liability approach, the statutes of many ad-hoc tribunals formed afterwards 
                                                                                                                                                       
with Scaliotti, supra note 5, at 133–35, and GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE 
GENERAL PART 296–301 (2d ed. 1961) (arguing, based on the post-World War II case law, 
that customary international law is supportive of a conditional liability approach). 
 55 S.C. Res. 827, art. 7.4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, art. 6.4, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda). 
 56 Rome Statute, supra note 14. 
 57 Id. art. 33.1(b)–(c). 
 58 See, e.g., Hilaire McCoubrey, From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring the Defence of 
Superior Orders, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 386, 386 (2001) (arguing that Article 33 merely 
recognizes the “ought to know doctrine” of customary international law rather than creating a 
new approach). 
 59 See Gaeta, supra note 33, at 173 (admitting that it seems as if the article’s phrasing 
supports the factual conditional liability approach). 
 60 See id. at 185; CASSESE, supra note 54, at 233 (contending that orders resulting in war 
crimes are always manifestly unlawful and thus will always result in soldier’s being held liable).  
 61 E.g., Ariel Zemach, Fairness and Moral Judgments in International Criminal Law: The 
Settlement Provision in the Rome Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 895, 913–15 (2003). 
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did not follow its path.  These statutes, similarly to those of ICTY and ICTR, 
adopted phrasing that clearly bars the application of any superior orders 
defense.62  Moreover, although the statutes of the different ad-hoc tribunals 
include a similarly phrased rule, how the tribunals applied the rule is far from 
similar.  In separate cases, the ICTY63 and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone64 have both ruled that when orders are manifestly unlawful they 
cannot be considered as a mitigating factor.  Furthermore, the ICTY trial 
chamber admitted in another case that “the current case law of the Tribunal 
does not evidence a discernible pattern of the Tribunal imposing sentences 
on subordinates that differ greatly from those imposed on their superiors.”65  
These rulings indicate that an equal liability approach was applied.  On the 
other hand, in many cases the East Timor Tribunal considered obedience to 
orders as a mitigating factor, even when the orders were manifestly illegal.66  
Additionally, the Iraqi Tribunal, when reviewing the compatibility of its 
statute’s rejection of the superior orders defense with the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”), stated a rationale applicable only 
to high-ranking soldiers, thus implying support for a conditional liability 
approach with regard to low-ranking soldiers.67  
This inconsistency exists even within the same tribunal.  For example, 
contrary to the general policy of the East Timor Tribunal stated above, 
judges of that Tribunal would sometimes refer to “mitigating factors such 
as . . . subordinate position,” but then mechanically discount these factors 
arguing they “cannot be given any significant weight in a case of this 
gravity.”68  Jurists within the ICTY have also disagreed, as evidenced by 
                                                                                                                                                       
 62 The Statutes of the tribunals in East Timor and Sierra Leone, as well as that of the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal explicitly state that obedience to orders cannot relieve a soldier of criminal 
responsibility, and only allow obedience to be considered “in mitigation of punishment if a 
panel determines that justice so requires.”  U.N.T.A.E.T. Reg. 2001/15, art. 21, U.N. Doc. 
UNTAET/REG/2001/15 (June 6, 2000) (establishing panels with exclusive jurisdiction over 
serious criminal offenses in East Timor); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-
Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 44 AL 
WAQAI AL-IRAQIYA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF IRAQ] 127 (2003) (codifying the reduced sentence 
approach in Art. 15(e)).  
 63 Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 65, 67 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004).  
 64 Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 121–122 
(Special Ct. for Sierra Leone July 19, 2007). 
 65 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 709 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001).  
 66 See generally Suzannah Linton & Caitlin Reiger, The Evolving Jurisprudence and 
Practice of East Timor’s Special Panels for Serious Crimes on Admissions of Guilt, Duress 
and Superior Orders, 4 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 167 (2001). 
 67 Anfal Campaign Case (2007) Ref. No. 1/CSecond/2006, Iraqi High Tribunal, 2d 
Criminal Court, Trial Judgment, 11. 
 68 Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of 
Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 565 (2005). 
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President Cassese’s dissenting opinion in the Erdemovic case, which 
implicitly supports a conditional liability approach by stating that “[i]f the 
superior order is manifestly illegal under international law, the subordinate is 
under a duty to refuse to obey the order.”69  Thus, the fate of soldiers 
committing similar crimes of obedience may be considerably different 
depending on the tribunal and the judge adjudicating their cases; a result that 
severely violates the principle of equal protection under the law.  
2.  American Military Law 
It has been suggested that the United States’ legal approach to crimes of 
obedience does not suffer from uncertainty and inconsistency.70  Indeed, 
since 1951, the Manual for Courts Martial includes a rule clearly supporting 
the factual approach to the superior orders defense.71  But, promulgation of 
this rule did not resolve a struggle that exists between U.S. supporters of 
different conditional liability approaches, a fact which is readily apparent in 
courts martial rulings after 1951.72 
An attempt to resolve this issue was made in United States v. Calley, 
which dealt with the My Lai massacre.73  In Calley, the trial judge instructed 
the jury to apply the factual approach adopted by the Manual for Courts 
Martial.  On appeal, the defense claimed the normative approach should have 
been applied instead.74  Thus, Calley presented the court with an opportunity 
                                                                                                                                                       
 69 Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Cassese, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 1997). 
 70 See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 570 (1978) (“Not all 
justificatory claims are vague . . . superior orders [is] . . . as precise as any prohibitory norm.”). 
 71 See United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 545 n.2 (C.M.A. 1973) (Duncan, J., 
concurring) (discussing the Manual published in 1951 as being the first military manual in 
which the current standard has been explicitly adopted). 
 72 See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 29 C.M.R. 438 (1960) (in this case the majority supported 
the factual approach; the minority judge, on the other hand, supported the normative approach, 
while giving some lip service support for the factual approach).  In many cases, the ruling is an 
intricate combination of phrases originating from one approach, interspersed with phrases 
originating from the other.  Due to this ambiguous wording, the identity of the approach actually 
being supported in such rulings can only be understood from the decision’s general tone.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Whatley, 20 C.M.R. 614, 618 (A.B.R. 1955) (supporting the normative 
approach despite discussion of a knowledge requirement); United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 
742, 773–76 (A.B.R. 1954) (supporting the factual approach despite a discussion of the 
manifestly unlawful requirement which interpret this requirement, at least in some parts of the 
case, in the manner in which it is interpreted by the normative approach).  
 73 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534 (C.M.A. 1973).  
 74 Id. at 541–42.  U.S. case law presents a unique version of the normative approach, where 
the illegality of an order needs to be so apparent that even the soldier with the “commonest 
understanding” would immediately recognize its illegality.  This approach is phrased in terms 
that focus on a soldier’s knowledge, but it is often assumed that the soldier with the 
“commonest understanding” will recognize the illegality of an order only when core social or 
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to clarify which approach should be endorsed by U.S. military tribunals, but 
the court did not do so.  Although the dissenting opinion examined several 
approaches in coming to the conclusion the normative approach should be 
applied,75 the majority was not as robust in its analysis and rejected the 
appeal based on procedural and formalistic reasons.76  Moreover, in a 
concurring opinion, Judge Duncan stated “[p]erhaps a new standard, such as 
the dissent suggests, has merit; however, I would leave that . . . for the cause 
where the record demonstrates harm from the instructions given.  I perceive 
none in this case.”77 
Furthermore, although some claim the factual approach is the rule of the 
day,78 a more in-depth examination of the issue shows that the current legal 
situation is more complex.  First, opinions still use language that borrows 
from the normative approach.79  There are even cases where judges 
seemingly hide their support for the normative approach behind their token 
obeisance to the factual approach.80  Second, obiter dicta that implies support 
for a normative approach can be found. For example, a 1995 opinion states 
“[t]he duty to disobey an unlawful order applies only to ‘a positive act that 
constitutes a crime’ that is ‘so manifestly beyond the legal power or 
discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of their 
unlawfulness.’ ”81  This statement implies that a soldier should obey if the 
illegal act ordered does not constitute a crime, which appears to be a 
normative approach. 
Third, even though the “law on the books” (i.e., the Manual for Courts 
Martial since 1951) states that a factual approach should be applied, once 
prosecutorial policy is taken into account, it seems that a normative approach 
is actually being applied.82  Military culture still supports the normative 
                                                                                                                                                       
moral norms are grossly violated by the illegal order.  Thus, this test actually applies the 
normative conditional liability approach and not the factual one.  For the leading classic cases 
supportive of the “commonest understanding” test, see McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 
1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) and In re Fair, 100 F. 149 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900). 
 75 Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 546–48 (Darden, C.J., dissenting). 
 76 Id. at 544–45. 
 77 Id. at 545 (Duncan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 78 See 2008 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 39; MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A 
GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW 68 (1999); see also United States v. Girouard, ARMY 
20070299, 2010 CCA LEXIS 49, at *15–16 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2010) (stressing the 
actual knowledge of the defendant).  
 79 See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 22 M.J. 284, 286 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. New, 
50 M.J. 729, 744 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (discussing obedience to manifestly unlawful orders).  
 80 E.g., United States v. Pacheco, 56 M.J. 1, 6–11 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
 81 United States v. Huet Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114–15 (1995) (quoting United States v. 
Calley, 22 U.S.M.C.A. at 543) (emphasis added); see also DEP’T OF DEF., THE ARMED FORCES 
OFFICER 16 (1988) (“Only when the order is unlawful and obviously a crime must it be 
disobeyed.”). 
 82 For a discussion of the common phenomenon of a difference between the law as it is 
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approach, and U.S. J.A.G. policy is thus to refrain from prosecution unless 
the act ordered and committed is grossly immoral.83  However, the law on 
the books still requires a soldier to disobey an order if she knows it to be 
illegal, which creates a fair-notice problem for a soldier who receives an 
order she thinks is illegal, but not grossly immoral.  Should she disobey and 
suffer the ire of her commander, as well as risk the chance she is mistaken 
and the order is legal?  Or, should she obey and rely on an unofficial 
prosecutorial policy that might easily be changed?  
III.  AGENCY ANALYSIS OF OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS 
A. Use of Agency Models 
In light of the inability to resolve the issue through the conventional use 
of the balancing procedure, the time has come to examine the issue from a 
new perspective.  This perspective should examine the relevant 
considerations in a less abstract manner than the current balancing procedure, 
which can be achieved using principal-agent analysis. 
The basic situation analyzed by microeconomics agency models can be 
described as follows: The principal profits from the acts of its agent and 
seeks to minimize costs while creating an incentive structure (i.e., rewards or 
sanctions) that will lead the agent to perform the acts in a way that 
maximizes the principal’s utility.  One fundamental problem the principal 
faces, often referred to as “moral hazard,” stems from the principal’s 
inability to obtain perfect information about how the agent acts.  If the agent 
knows that her actions are unobservable, she can attempt to maximize her 
own personal gains, even if that conflicts with the principal’s gains.  Agency 
analyses often focus on ex ante conditions that a principal can set to 
minimize this problem.84   
Agency analyses have been expanded to examine situations in which 
more than one agent exists.85  This sort of expanded analysis is commonly 
used when examining a corporation’s vicarious liability.86  Such analyses 
examine a three-tiered hierarchy of principals and agents, where a 
                                                                                                                                                       
stated in the books and the law as it is actually applied, see Pound, supra note 48.  
 83 OSIEL, supra note 10, at 76; Walter M. Hudson, Book Review, 161 MIL. L. REV. 225, 
226–27 (1999) (reviewing OSIEL, supra note 10). 
 84 See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 477–88 (1995) 
(describing the principal-agent problem). 
 85 E.g., Yeong Ling Yang, Degree of Supervision, Moral Hazard and Hierarchical Control, 
26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 93 (1995). 
 86 See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1233 
(1984) (noting that agency theory is essential to understanding the consequences of vicarious 
liability).    
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corporation’s employees are viewed as agents of the corporation, and both 
the corporation and its employees are viewed as agents of the lawmaker.87  
The core question examined is: When should the lawmaker, in an attempt to 
prevent wrongful corporate acts, enact a law that sanctions the corporation, 
the employees, or both? 
B.  Agency Model of Obedience to Orders 
An in-depth agency analysis of crimes of obedience has never been 
performed.  However, Eric Posner and Alan Sykes have recently examined 
the relationship between state and individual responsibility for violations of 
international law, treating it as analogous to vicarious liability analysis.  
Within their study, they entertain a short discussion of the superior orders 
defense:  
The question arises, why the qualification for “patently” illegal 
orders?  Why not hold soldiers liable for all war crimes, just as 
an employee will be held liable for committing domestic 
crimes, and the fact that the employer ordered him to commit 
the crimes would be no defense?  The answer is probably that 
states do not want to go give soldiers an excuse for 
insubordination.  The rule balances the desire to deter soldiers 
from engaging in war crimes, and the need to maintain 
discipline on the field.88  
While I agree with Posner and Sykes that crimes of obedience should be 
examined using agency analysis, their examination of the issue, as the 
discussion made hereinafter will show, is flawed.  Posner and Sykes fall prey 
to the same flaw that plagues the rest of the field.  They attempt to balance 
two public aims, the rule of law and military discipline, in an abstract manner 
instead of determining how these considerations should be factored into an 
agency analysis.  When this concern is addressed at the outset, a detailed 
agency analysis of the issue leads to a different conclusion than the one 
reached by Posner and Sykes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 87 Scholarly writings on the subject have not been consistent in the names of the roles given 
to each of the three participants in this relational structure.  Usually in these analyses, the 
corporation is dubbed as the principal and the lawmaker is treated as an external (but superior) 
source of influence on the corporate agency relation.  But see Mark A. Cohen, Optimal 
Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with 
Moral Hazard, 30 J.L. & ECON. 23, 25 (1987) (explicitly dubbing the government as the 
principal of the corporation).  
 88 Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual 
Responsibility Under International Law, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 72, 129 (2007). 
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A crime is an act that the lawmaker wishes to prevent through the use of 
penal law (i.e., an act harmful to the principal).  A person will want to 
commit a crime when the potential gains outweigh the potential losses.  
Therefore, a lawmaker can deter an individual from committing a crime by 
increasing the severity of the punishment or by increasing the probability that 
an individual will be caught and convicted.89 
A crime of obedience is an act that is harmful to the lawmaker and that is 
committed as the result of a joint action by two agents: the commander who 
issues the order, and the subordinate who physically commits the illegal act.  
In the context of crimes of obedience, the gains against which individual 
actors measure the potential costs of a crime may sometimes be societal, as 
opposed to personal, gains.  Soldiers often commit crimes wrongly believing 
the illegal act will serve a greater good.90  
If both subordinate and commander stand to gain equally from a crime 
and have the same probability of being punished, then the same legal threat 
of punishment can deter each of them from taking part in the crime.  
Moreover, since a crime of obedience only occurs when both of them 
participate, the lawmaker need only adopt a law that threatens to punish 
either subordinate or commander.  Furthermore, if the lawmaker is only 
concerned with efficiency, she will be indifferent as to which individual the 
law targets.91 
Let us demonstrate this issue using the following example: (1) both the 
soldier and commander are willing to commit a crime as long as they expect 
to receive a term of imprisonment less than ten years; (2) for both parties, a 
50% chance of being caught and convicted for a term of twenty years is as 
much a deterrent as a certainty of being sentenced for ten years; (3) law 
enforcement agencies have a 50% chance of catching and convicting either 
party; and (4) once one party has been caught and convicted, there is a 100% 
chance of catching and convicting the second party.  Under these conditions, 
the lawmaker needs to set a sentence of twenty years to ensure neither party 
will participate in the crime of obedience.  And, since only one party need be 
deterred for a crime of obedience to be prevented, it is sufficient to threaten 
either the subordinate or commander with a sentence of twenty years.  
In reality, the analysis is not so neat, as substantial differences exist that 
distinguish a subordinate’s cost-benefit analysis from that of a commander’s.  
On one hand, disobeying an illegal order often harms the subordinate 
                                                                                                                                                       
 89 E.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 249 (1987).  
 90 See S.E. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 32–53 
(2d ed. 1988). 
 91 Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and 
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1358–60 (1982). 
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because a commander can sanction her for such behavior on-site.92  There is 
thus an additional incentive for a subordinate to commit a crime of 
obedience.  Therefore, all else being equal, it will be harder to deter a 
subordinate than a commander.  On the other hand, because subordinates are 
the ones that physically perform crimes of obedience, while commanders are 
sometimes not even present during the commission of the crime, it is often 
easier to catch and convict a subordinate.93  As a result, a law that addresses 
only the commander suffers from an evidentiary deficit, which effects its 
deterrence capabilities, that a law addressing either the subordinate, or both 
the subordinate and the commander, does not.  
Also, in reality, the lawmaker is limited in her ability to increase 
punishment as a means to deter the commission of a crime.  First, economic, 
moral, and constitutional considerations generally limit the lawmaker’s 
ability to do so.  Without such limits, one can imagine a utilitarian lawmaker 
instituting the death penalty as the punishment for all crimes.94  Second, 
when setting the maximum penalty for each crime, the lawmaker must 
consider whether the punishment set would sufficiently deter the commission 
of the relevant crime regardless of whether individuals are acting under 
orders.  For example, murders are committed by both obedient soldiers and 
individuals not acting under orders.  Thus, the penalty set for murder needs 
to deter both cases.95  To deal specifically with crimes of obedience, the 
lawmaker will thus often need to supplement the general legal prohibition 
                                                                                                                                                       
 92 Natasha Gonzalez, Moral Monsters or Ordinary Men Who Do Monstrous Things? 
Psychological Dimensions of the Military and Their Implications for War Crimes Tribunal 
Defenses 112 (June 2004) (unpublished Psy.D. dissertation, Widener University) (on file with 
Widener University).  Such sanctions can be formal or informal. 
 93 DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 237–38 (discussing this issue in the context of war crimes); 
Jeffrey I. Ross, Controlling Crimes by the Military, in CONTROLLING STATE CRIME 115, 126–
27 (J.I. Ross ed., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing this issue in the context of domestic crimes).  
 94 See, e.g., Samuel Kramer, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal 
Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398, 404 
(1990) (discussing negative enforcement costs as the reason harsh punishment is not 
uniformly adopted for all crimes—the death penalty is the harshest punishment I can 
imagine); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–22, 30–32 (implying a need to take 
constitutional and moral considerations into account).  For a general discussion of such 
considerations not by law and economy scholars, see Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to 
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory 
Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997) and FELICITY STEWART ET AL., SENT’G ADVISORY 
COUNCIL – VICT. AUSTL., MAXIMUM PENALTIES: PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES, at vii (2010).  See 
also sources cited infra note 96. 
 95 Supposedly, the lawmaker can create two sets of penal codes; one for crimes not 
committed under orders, and the other for the same prohibited acts committed under orders.  I 
know of no legal system that has chosen such an option.  It is most likely the costs that usually 
accompany over-detailed legal policies have led lawmakers not to endorse such an option.  
For a brief discussion of the costs of over-detailed legal policies, see infra Part V.A.2. 
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with legal norms that deal specifically with this issue.  These norms can take 
the form of setting the act of giving or obeying an illegal order as a 
mitigating, exculpating, or aggravating condition.  However, when setting 
such rules, the lawmaker will also be limited by moral and constitutional 
considerations.96 
Lastly, setting a law that addresses only the subordinate is not really an 
option, as moral concerns should prevent lawmakers from adopting such a 
policy.  Even though subordinates physically commit the illegal acts, the 
commander should be considered the main perpetrator of such crimes, both 
because of the power she has over the subordinate and because the 
commander issues the order in the first place.  As such, as a general rule, the 
commander should never be considered less culpable than the obedient 
soldier.97  Therefore, it would be wrong for the lawmaker to adopt a legal 
norm that punishes only the subordinate and not the commander, or punishes 
the commander less severely than the subordinate.  The options available to a 
lawmaker are thus a legal policy that addresses only the commander, or a 
policy that addresses both the commander and subordinate.   
C.  Command Responsibility Rule  
A law targeting only commanders can be efficient only if the evidentiary 
problem can be solved.  This can be done by utilizing a strict-liability-
command-responsibility rule that holds the commander automatically 
responsible for all illegal acts committed by her subordinates.98  
In the context of many crimes of obedience, it is easier to find evidence 
that a crime has been committed by soldiers of a specific unit than to find 
                                                                                                                                                       
 96 Actual domestic criminal justice systems are based on a theoretical basis that combines 
consequentialist and deontological rationales.  E.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in 
Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326 (2004). That is also the case in international 
criminal law.  See Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 63.  In such a system, as Coughlin stated, 
“principles derived from one of the dominant theories attenuate the excesses that the other 
would achieve in an undiluted form.”  Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 9–10 (1994).  Accordingly, the deontological principles place limits on the ability to 
hold subordinates and commanders culpable for acts initiated by the other agent.  See, e.g., 
text accompanying infra note 97 and the limits placed on command responsibility rules, infra 
Part III.C.  
 97 Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt Hospital Ship “Llandovery Castle,” 
2 ANN. DIG. 436 (1921), reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 721, 723 (1922); Miriam Gur-
Arye, Commission of an Offence: Various Modes, 1 PLILIM 29, 47–49 (1990) (Heb.); see also 
United States v. Duffy, 47 C.M.R. 658 (A.C.M.R. 1973) (finding the commander who orders 
an act is a principal actor and not merely an accessory, and thus ruling the commander can be 
convicted even when the obedient soldier is not).  
 98 Osiel, supra note 20, at 1113; Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the 
Gander Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of 
Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 347 (2007). 
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evidence proving which individual soldier committed the criminal act.99  It is 
even more difficult to prove the illegal act was ordered by a commander, 
especially if the commander was not physically present during the 
commission of the crime.100  Moreover, without the aid of the subordinates 
who received the order it would often be extremely difficult to prove the 
commander ordered the crime, and subordinates will not be incentivized to 
implicate their commanders if the law does not also target subordinates.101  
But, a strict-liability-command-responsibility rule solves this difficulty 
because adopting such a rule would mean the aid of the subordinates would 
no longer be required.  This rule would make it easier to convict a 
commander of a unit than it would be to convict any particular subordinate. 
Yet from a deontological perspective, it is inappropriate to hold the 
commander criminally responsible for the acts of her subordinates when her 
direct involvement in the crime (e.g., giving the illegal order or participating 
in the crime) has not been proven.102  The increasing influence of this 
perspective on both domestic and international criminal law constrains 
lawmakers’ ability to enact an efficient law that only addresses commanders.  
Even in the context of war crimes, adopting a strict-liability-command-
responsibility rule is currently seen as unacceptable.103  For example, 
according to the Rome Statute there is a need to prove: (1) the “military 
commander . . . either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, 
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes”;104 and (2) the “military commander . . . failed to take all necessary 
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution.”105  
Because currently a lawmaker is barred from adopting a command 
responsibility rule harsher than the one just stated, she should not adopt a 
                                                                                                                                                       
 99 E.g., Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 189 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2008). 
 100 See sources cited supra note 93. 
 101 See White, supra note 21, at 61; Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International 
Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L. F. 281, 312 (2006) (arguing the ICTY’s prosecution of lower-
ranking soldiers ultimately led to prosecution of higher ranking individuals). 
 102 See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THINKING IT THROUGH: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 288–89 (2003) (discussing the readiness of utilitarian views, and 
the objection of deontological views, to punish uninvolved individuals). 
 103 Osiel, supra note 20, at 1064; Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty 
Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. passim (2005); see also Prosecutor v. Jean-
Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 488–489 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998). 
 104 Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 28(a)(i). 
 105 Id. art. 28(a)(ii); see also Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 488–491 
(recognizing the potential for an even more restrictive rule for civilian superiors). 
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policy that only addresses commanders.  Instead, in addition to adopting the 
“permitted” command responsibility rule, the lawmaker should also adopt a 
rule that will be addressed to the obedient soldier.  The experience of legal 
systems that adopted this latter policy indicates that it can attain greater 
crime prevention than the former one.  As past cases in such legal systems 
indicate106 the likelihood of successfully convicting a commander on the 
basis of the “permitted” command responsibility rule is, at least sometimes, 
lower than the likelihood of successfully convicting subordinates for being 
directly involved in the commission of the crime (because as previously 
discussed, it is sometimes easier to find evidence against subordinates). 
The deontological perspective has further influenced the field by lowering 
the socially acceptable level of punishment in cases where direct 
involvement of the commander has not been proven.107  This effect is less 
apparent in prosecutions of war crimes in international tribunals, since the 
statutes of such tribunals usually include a single maximum penalty for all 
international crimes.108  Yet in domestic law, the deontological perspective 
has already had a substantial effect.  It is most significant in the context of 
domestic crimes committed outside of war.  With regard to such crimes, 
penal sanctions are generally considered inappropriate unless direct 
involvement of the commander in the crime is stipulated. That is, in cases 
dealing with indirect involvement of a commander in the crime (i.e., cases 
where just a commander’s failure to know or prevent a subordinate’s crime is 
alleged) only administrative and disciplinary sanctions, and not the harsher 
penal ones, are considered appropriate.109  Moreover, even in the context of 
domestic, war-related crimes, if no direct involvement in the crime is proven, 
the maximum penalty a commander can receive is, usually, substantially 
lower than the maximum penalty for the war-related crime itself.110 
                                                                                                                                                       
 106 E.g., Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-63-A, ¶ 189.  Furthermore, compare the conviction of 
subordinate Calley, in the context of the My Lai massacre, United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 
(C.M.A. 1973), with the acquittal of superior Medina as discussed in Natalia M. Restivo, Defense 
of Superior Orders in International Criminal Law as Portrayed in Three Trials: Eichmann, Calley 
and England (Sept. 12, 2006) (graduate student paper, Cornell Law School), available at http:// 
schoolarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=lps_papers. 
 107 See Danner & Martinez, supra note 103, at 99–100 (noting that, in the context of the law 
of command responsibility, a demand exists for the application of culpability principles that 
ensure individuals are convicted because they had a role in the commission of the crime, not 
just because a crime occurred). 
 108 Jennifer Clark, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1688–89 (2008).  
 109 IAN LEIGH & HANS BORN, ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUR., HANDBOOK ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 211, 214 
(2008). 
 110 See Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and 
International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251, 275 (2009) (comparing the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice’s six month maximum penalty for a commander’s dereliction of duty with 
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Trends in domestic law also have substantial effects on international 
criminal law, since many war crimes are prosecuted by domestic courts.111  
Often in these domestic prosecutions, the individual is formally charged with 
violating a domestic offense that is an analogue of an international offense.112  
In the United States for example, commanders who fail to know about and 
prevent war crimes committed by subordinates are usually prosecuted in 
domestic courts martial for “dereliction of duty,” which carries a much lower 
maximum penalty than that of any war crime.113  Because of this difference 
in the permitted harshness of maximum penalties, the lawmaker is limited in 
her ability to rely on a command responsibility rule as a means to deter 
crimes of obedience.  Thus, although the law should target commanders and 
apply a command responsibility rule to the extent permitted, it will generally 
be more effective for the law to also target the subordinate. 
D.  Agency Analysis of the Five Commonly Endorsed Approaches 
1.  Equal Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Reduced Sentence 
Approaches   
There are several alternatives for a legal approach that addresses both 
subordinates and commanders.  One such alternative is the equal liability 
approach, which sets the same level of culpability for both commanders and 
subordinates for their direct involvement in the commission of a crime of 
obedience.114  This approach will deter subordinates, in some situations, from 
obeying illegal orders even when the penalty for the crime, or the 
commanders’ probability of being caught and convicted, would not deter 
commanders from issuing such orders.  Because subordinates physically 
                                                                                                                                                       
federal law’s twenty or thirty year penalties for war crimes).  In Israeli law, for example, the 
main way to hold a commander liable for the acts of her subordinates is to charge her with the 
military offense of “Failure to Prevent an Offence.”  In the past, the maximum penalty for a 
commander convicted of such an offense was half the maximum penalty for the offense she 
failed to prevent.  See Art. 74 of the Emergency Regulations (Military Justice Constitution) of 
1948, 20 Official Paper, 2d appendix 105 (Isr.).  Currently, the maximum penalty still cannot 
be more than half the maximum penalty for the offense the commander failed to prevent.  Yet, 
additionally, the sentence for the failure to prevent most offenses cannot exceed three years.  
See Military Justice Act, 5715-1955, SH. No. 171, art. 134 (Isr.). 
 111 Joseph Rikhof, Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions 
on International Impunity, 20 CRIM. L. F. 1, 51 (2009). 
 112 See Knut Dörmann & Robin Geiβ, The Implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic 
Legal Orders, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 703, 709–10 (2009) (noting that most countries have 
constitutional prohibitions against criminal sanctions based solely on international law, thus 
requiring a domestic basis for punishment); see also Rikhof, supra note 111, at 15 n.61.   
 113 Sepinwall, supra note 110, at 275. 
 114 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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perform the crime,115 it will sometimes be easier to find evidence sufficient 
to convict the subordinate for her direct involvement in the crime than it 
would be to convict a commander, even under a command responsibility rule 
and even though the latter rule does not require proof of direct involvement.  
Thus, the equal liability approach, by holding both the commander and 
subordinate responsible, can prevent crimes of obedience that would be 
committed under a law that addresses only the commander.116  Some argue 
this has been the reason for the application of this approach in international 
law following World War II.  As M.C. Bassiouni states, “it became clear 
after World War II that holding only the superiors responsible would not 
accomplish the goals of deterrence and prevention. Consequently, a new 
policy approach was developed whereby those carrying out unlawful orders 
would be held criminally accountable, in addition to those who issued the 
orders.”117  
Another alternative is the respondeat superior approach, which allows the 
subordinate to always benefit from a superior orders defense while holding 
the commander responsible.118  Under the respondent superior approach, a 
soldier is not likely to be deterred from obeying illegal orders, since she 
could avoid punishment and enjoy a superior orders defense simply by 
showing the act was a crime of obedience.119  But, this approach could deter 
commanders from giving illegal orders more effectively than a law that only 
addresses commanders.  It would incentivize soldiers to implicate their 
                                                                                                                                                       
 115 See sources cited supra note 93.  
 116 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 586 (noting that the humanitarian goals of deterring and 
preventing harm to protected targets cannot be accomplished by holding only superiors 
responsible). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 119 This approach, in the way it was applied in the past, threatened the subordinate with 
punishment for disobeying any illegal order.  See id.  But even without such a threat, a 
subordinate soldier is unlikely to be deterred from obeying illegal orders under a respondeat 
superior approach since she could avoid punishment by showing the crime was a crime of 
obedience.  It is true that such a policy places some burden of production of evidence on the 
subordinate, whether formally, or simply because she has an incentive to do so.  Thus, one can 
imagine a situation in which: (1) a subordinate knows she has a high probability of getting 
caught and convicted; and (2) she further knows that if caught she will have no ability to show 
the act was ordered by her commander.  In such a situation, even under a respondeat superior 
approach, the subordinate may still disobey.  Yet, these situations are likely to be rare for two 
reasons.  First, due to moral and constitutional considerations, the burden of proof a lawmaker 
can demand from a subordinate is much lower than demanding her to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the act was ordered by her commander.  See ROBINSON, supra note 17, at 
209; GEERT-JAN KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 259–
61 (2d ed. 2007) (articulating the relevant burden of proof).  Second, the subordinate will 
often have at least some evidence implicating the commander.  See Ross, supra note 93, at 
126–27; White, supra note 21, at 61; Murphy, supra note 101, at 312. 
28  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:1  
commanders, thus increasing the probability commanders would be caught 
and convicted.120  
In some situations, the respondeat superior approach can more effectively 
deter crimes of obedience than the equal liability approach.  For example, as 
previously discussed, the lawmaker often will not be able to successfully 
deter a commander as well as she is able to deter a subordinate, due to a 
difference in the probability of getting caught and convicted.121  Let us 
further assume two things: (1) the lawmaker cannot further increase the 
maximum punishment for the crime as a means of deterrence;122 and (2) due 
to budgetary or other such limitations, the lawmaker is unable to rely on the 
efforts of law enforcement agencies as a means of increasing the probability 
of catching crimes of obedience.123  Thus, we can expect situations will exist 
in which, under the equal liability approach, both the subordinate and the 
commander will not be deterred, and the lawmaker will not be able to use 
increases in penalties or law-enforcement efforts to increase deterrence. 
In some of these cases, choosing the respondeat superior approach over 
the equal liability approach can increase deterrence.  While switching to the 
respondeat superior approach will not change the behavior of the subordinate 
(since she is likely to obey illegal orders when the lawmaker adopts the 
respondeat superior approach) adopting the respondeat superior approach can 
increase deterrence against the commander.  Under the equal liability 
approach the subordinate does not have an incentive to implicate the 
commander, since it will not have any effect on her fate.  On the other hand, 
under the respondeat superior approach, she has a strong incentive to 
implicate her commander.  She could assert a superior orders defense by 
showing her action was a crime of obedience, thereby avoiding punishment.  
The evidence supplied by the subordinate can then be used against the 
commander, increasing the probability of the commander being implicated 
and convicted.124  This increased probability will, at least sometimes, be 
                                                                                                                                                       
 120 See Ross, supra note 93, at 126–27; White, supra note 21, at 61 (discussing the 
consequential effects of prosecuting lower ranking soldiers). 
 121 See supra Part III.C (discussing the command responsibility rule).   
 122 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 77 (establishing maximum penalties for 
crimes).  Moreover, as previously discussed, there are different considerations that limit the 
ability of the lawmaker to use punishment to deter crimes in general, and crimes of obedience 
specifically.  See sources cited supra notes 94, 96–97 & Part III.C.   
 123 This is a very realistic assumption.  See Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, 
Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 163, 185 (1988) (“[T]he criminal justice system may [sometimes] be able to do 
very little in terms of changing actual probabilities of arrests for crimes. . . .”). 
 124 The evidence could be used at the commander’s trial to prove she ordered the crimes.  
Moreover, even if the evidence will not be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
commander ordered the crimes, we can assume they will make it easier to show the 
commander knew, or should have known, about the crimes, or that she failed to prevent them.   
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sufficient to deter the commander from ordering the crime in the first place.  
Thus, situations exist in which the respondeat superior approach will prevent 
crimes more efficiently than the equal liability approach.125  
However, the respondeat superior approach will not always be more 
effective than the equal liability approach.  Many situations can be found in 
which threatening the subordinate with punishment will deter her from 
obeying the illegal order.  In some of these situations, a commander will not 
be deterred by either the equal liability or the respondeat superior approach. 
In other words, in some of these situations, even the increased probability of 
detection and conviction of the commander under the respondeat superior 
approach will be insufficient to deter her.  
United States v. Calley, a case arising out of the My Lai Massacre, 
provides a convenient example for illustrating these situations.126  In Calley, 
the subordinate alleged that he committed the acts under orders from his 
superior, Medina.127  His claim was sufficiently robust so that, at trial, the 
jury was instructed to consider whether Calley is eligible for a superior 
orders defense.128  Further, there is a strong possibility the jury was 
convinced Calley had obeyed such orders.129  However, despite the evidence 
supplied by Calley, at Medina’s trial the prosecution failed to prove that 
Medina gave the orders, or that Medina even knew or should have known 
that his subordinates committed the crimes.130  This case thus indicates that 
situations can be found where: (1) it will be easier to prove the direct 
involvement of a subordinate than to prove either the direct or indirect 
                                                                                                                                                       
 125 The likelihood of such situations is high because a subordinate has an additional 
incentive to commit the crime that the commander does not have; the fear of being sanctioned 
by her commander for disobedience.  See Gonzalez, supra note 92.  Thus all else being equal, 
it will be harder to deter subordinates from obeying illegal orders than it will be to deter 
commanding officers from issuing them. 
 126 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534 (C.M.A. 1973).  
 127 Id. at 538 (“Asked if women and children were to be killed, Medina said he replied in the 
negative. . . .  However, Lieutenant Calley testified that Captain Medina informed the troops 
they were to kill every living thing. . . .”). 
 128 At trial, evidence supporting both Medina’s and Calley’s claims was presented.  The trial 
judge instructed the jury “unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting 
under orders . . . you must determine whether Lieutenant Calley” knew or should have known 
the orders were illegal.  Id. at 542. 
 129 The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, ruling on a habeas corpus 
petition presented by Calley, determined it is very likely the jury was improperly influenced by 
news reports to decide Medina did not give the orders.  Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650, 
685–86 (M.D. Ga. 1974).  Yet on appeal that decision was overturned, and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed prior rulings of the military courts that found a strong possibility the jury concluded 
Calley had received the orders from Medina, yet decided to convict regardless.  Calley v. 
Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 193–94 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he military jury could have found either 
that the alleged order to kill was not issued, or, if it was, that the order was not a defense to the 
charges.  The military courts found ample evidence to support either hypothesis.”).  
 130 Restivo, supra note 106, at 18–19.  
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involvement of a commander; and (2) a commander may not be convicted or 
deterred even given an incentive structure that encourages subordinates to 
implicate their commanders. 
In other words, there is a tradeoff between the respondeat superior 
approach and the equal liability approach.  When crime prevention is more 
likely to be achieved by a policy focused on attempts to deter the 
commander, the respondeat superior approach will be more efficient.  On the 
other hand, when crime prevention is more likely to be achieved by a policy 
focused on attempts to deter the subordinate, the equal liability approach will 
be more efficient.  
An alternative approach exists, however, that can act as a better deterrent 
than either approach.  Until now, we have assumed that a soldier will only 
implicate her commander if she receives full protection from punishment 
through a superior orders defense.  In reality however, the commander only 
has a modest ability to pressure a soldier who has already been caught 
because the prosecuting authority can often protect the subordinate by 
removing her or the commander from the unit, or taking other protective 
measures.131  As such, a very small incentive will often suffice to convince 
the soldier to implicate her superior.132 
Thus, a reduced sentence approach that offers a soldier the smallest 
sentence reduction possible to encourage her to implicate her commander has 
the advantages of both the equal liability and the respondeat superior 
approaches.  Commanders would be deterred, just as they would under the 
respondeat superior approach, because subordinates would still be 
incentivized to implicate them.  Moreover, the deterrent effect of each 
additional day in prison is likely to be less than that of the previous day.  
Accordingly, a small sentence reduction is not likely to have a significant 
influence on the law’s deterrent effect on subordinates.  Thus, the deterrent 
effect the reduced sentence approach has on a subordinate is almost identical 
to the deterrent effect of the equal liability approach.133  
                                                                                                                                                       
 131 E.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE (2011), available at 
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf (discussing means available to protect soldiers 
who are witnesses). 
 132 Cf. Ada Kewley, Murder and the Availability of the Defence of Duress in the Criminal 
Law, 57 J. CRIM. L. 298, 299 (1993) (stating with regard to the duress defense: “[g]enerally, it 
should be noted that the defence is not available where the defendant has a realistic 
opportunity to seek official protection”).  
 133 Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of 
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–4 (1999) (arguing it is 
likely that the deterrent effect of each additional day in prison is less than that of the previous 
day, thus plea bargains are unlikely to reduce deterrence); Andreas Reindl, Background Note, 
in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., DAF/COMP(2007)38, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: PLEA 
BARGAINING 21, 43 (2007) (arguing that if the prosecuting authority is able to exert strict 
sanctions in plea bargain agreements, which it is if there is a credible threat of sanctions at 
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Despite these benefits, the reduced sentence approach should not be 
applied in every situation.  The reduced sentence approach requires the 
subordinate soldier to recognize illegal orders and disobey them (otherwise 
she would be held criminally responsible).  In reality, soldiers do not have 
perfect knowledge of the law.  Therefore, a duty to disobey illegal orders 
may lead to two kinds of mistakes: (1) the soldier might mistakenly obey 
illegal orders, thinking they are legal; or (2) she may mistakenly disobey 
legal orders, thinking they are illegal.  In comparison, when a subordinate is 
afforded a superior orders defense, such as under the respondeat superior 
approach, it is unlikely the subordinate will disobey orders regardless of their 
legality, and similar concerns about mistakes do not exist. 
Thus, the likelihood a subordinate will make a mistake has an effect on 
whether the reduced sentence rule should be adopted as opposed to an 
approach that affords a superior orders defense.  The greater the possibility 
subordinates will mistakenly obey illegal orders, the less there is a crime 
prevention benefit from adopting a reduced sentence rule.  Furthermore, a 
reduced sentence rule can encourage a soldier to mistakenly disobey legal 
orders, which is harmful to the lawmaker when she benefits from the 
performance of legal military actions.134  
Thus, when the gains (i.e., the crime prevention achieved by obligating 
the soldier to disobey orders she thinks are illegal) will be smaller than the 
harm caused by mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders, a reduced 
sentence approach should not be adopted.  Instead, the subordinate should be 
encouraged to obey orders she thinks are illegal, by way of affording her a 
superior orders defense.   
2.  Agency Analysis of Conditional Liability Approaches 
By demonstrating that neither affording a superior orders defense nor 
applying a reduced sentence approach will always maximize a lawmaker’s 
utility, agency analysis has shown the appropriate solution is an intermediate 
one.  This Section thus examines whether either of the two commonly 
endorsed conditional liability approaches should be adopted (i.e., the factual 
approach and the normative approach) since both of these approaches 
advance an intermediate solution. 
Both the reduced sentence approach and the factual conditional liability 
approach instruct subordinates to disobey any order they believe is illegal.135  
Yet, each approach has a different effect on a subordinate’s behavior.  As 
previously stated, soldiers do not have perfect knowledge of the law.  Under 
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 134 Osiel, supra note 20, at 967.  
 135 See supra note 39. 
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both approaches, a soldier will be punished if she mistakenly disobeys a legal 
order.  The two approaches differ in how they treat a soldier who mistakenly 
obeys an illegal order.  The reduced sentence approach calls for the 
punishment of such a soldier, whereas the factual approach allows for the 
acquittal of a soldier whose mistaken obedience is deemed reasonable.  Thus, 
a higher threshold of doubt is attached to the factual approach than is 
attached to the reduced sentence approach.  Under the factual approach, a 
soldier will only disobey when she thinks it is relatively clear an order is 
illegal, while under the reduced sentence approach, the soldier will tend to 
disobey even when she is less certain about an order’s legality. 
But how certain a soldier is that an order is illegal, and the probability 
that her assessment is correct, are two very different issues.136  To say that a 
soldier is 90% sure an order is illegal, is not the same as saying that 90% of 
the times in which she receives orders similar to the order just received, such 
orders will be illegal.  Therefore, the factual approach encourages a soldier to 
obey in cases of doubt more frequently than the respondeat superior 
approach, and yet it often does not increase the accuracy of the soldier’s 
determinations.  Thus, situations exist in which the reduced sentence 
approach will better serve the lawmaker, even though it will increase 
mistaken acts of disobedience. 
Other situations also exist where, even under the factual approach, 
mistakenly disobeying legal orders will lead to great harm.  The probability 
that a soldier might mistakenly disobey legal orders, even under a factual 
approach, is relatively high in certain military situations, especially during 
combat.  Because a commander has more expertise than a subordinate, as 
well as more access to sensitive information, a factual approach will often 
elicit “disobedience to orders that appear wrongful from the soldier’s 
restricted perspective but which are actually justified by larger operational 
circumstances.”137  Thus, we can imagine cases where the factual approach 
will lead to harm caused by mistaken acts of disobedience, which will 
outweigh the crime prevention benefits it might otherwise offer the 
lawmaker.  In these cases, the lawmaker should adopt an approach that 
further encourages a subordinate to obey orders she suspects are illegal.  The 
normative approach is one such approach.  
Unlike the factual approach, the normative approach is an intermediate 
solution that does not instruct the subordinate to disobey all illegal orders; 
instead it instructs her to obey some, but only some, illegal orders.  That is, it 
                                                                                                                                                       
 136 Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1195 (1989) (discussing limits 
on deference to authority). 
 137 OSIEL, supra note 10, at 64; see also Richard A. Wasserstrom, Individual Responsibility 
in Warfare, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE 194, 195, 
202 (Peter D. Trooboff ed., 1975). 
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instructs subordinates to disobey only when an order is both illegal and 
grossly immoral.138  Supporters of this approach assume most soldiers can 
recognize when an order is both illegal and immoral, and thus this approach 
reduces the chance subordinates will mistakenly disobey legal orders while 
also increasing the accuracy of the soldiers’ determinations of an order’s 
legality.139  Yet, this is often not the case.  In many combat situations, the 
subordinate either does not have sufficient expertise or access to all the 
necessary information needed to evaluate the situation.  Thus, “[a]n act that 
seems to the uninformed as manifestly wrong may actually be morally 
justified.”140  Therefore, like under the factual approach, there will be 
situations in which the harm from mistaken acts of disobedience to legal 
orders will still be too high, and a way needs to be found that further restricts 
subordinates’ discretion.  
Supporters of the normative approach also claim it sufficiently reduces 
the harm caused by crimes of obedience because of its prohibition against 
committing grossly immoral illegal acts.141  As such, the most harmful 
crimes of obedience are prevented, while the harm caused if soldiers are 
further encouraged to disobey orders they suspect are illegal is also averted.  
However, this premise is not always true, and the lawmaker’s utility (i.e., the 
balance between the crime prevention gains, on the one hand, and the harm 
caused by mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders, on the other) will 
sometimes be better served if the subordinate is instructed to disobey orders 
she suspects are illegal even if they are not grossly immoral. 
For example, in an Israeli court martial dubbed “The Bread Case,” the 
following domestic-law scenario was dealt with: a soldier and a commander 
were delivering bread when the commander gave the soldier an illegal order 
to throw seventy-eight loaves of bread to the side of the road so they could 
go home early.142  While such an order is not grossly immoral, subordinates 
can easily recognize it is illegal and are not likely to confuse such an illegal 
order with any legal order.  Therefore, the approach adopted in this instance 
should instruct soldiers to disobey the order even if it is not grossly immoral, 
which is exactly what the Israel court martial did.143 
                                                                                                                                                       
 138 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 139 See sources cited supra notes 36–37. 
 140 Barak Medina, Political Disobedience in the IDF: The Scope of the Legal Rights of 
Soldiers to Be Excused From Taking Part in Military Activities in the Occupied Territories, 36 
ISR. L. REV. 73, 82 (2002).  
 141 See supra notes 36–37. 
 142 Mil. Appeal/15/65 Chief Military Prosecutor v. Gil & Hadar, 1965 PDZ 28 (Isr.). 
 143 Id. at 30 (ruling that an illegal order, given in order to serve a private end of a commander, 
should always be disobeyed).  A similar rule has been adopted in many other legal systems.  See, 
e.g., 2008 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 39, art. 90(c)(2)(a)(iv) (United States); 
LEIGH & BORN, supra note 109, at 213 (Belgium and Lithuania); Sahir Erman, Compliance with 
Superior Orders Under Domestic Criminal Law and Under the Law of War, 10 MIL. L. & L. 
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In sum, agency analysis indicates that supporters of any of the commonly 
endorsed approaches were wrong in advancing a one-rule-fits-all application 
of their preferred approach.  If the relationship between crime prevention 
(i.e., rule of law) and the benefits to the lawmaker from a well-functioning 
armed force (i.e., military discipline) is examined in a less abstract manner 
than a single balancing test, the conclusion that should be reached is that 
none of these approaches is preferable in all situations.  Between adopting a 
reduced sentence norm and the alternative of adopting a superior orders 
defense, each legal policy will only sometimes be preferable to the other. 
Furthermore, a respondeat superior norm should not be endorsed in every 
situation in which a reduced sentence norm should not be applied. Instead, in 
many situations an intermediate solution should be adopted.  Yet, the kind of 
intermediate solution that should be adopted differs according to the 
individual situation.  Thus, the findings of agency analysis have a further 
reaching implication; indicating that the core premise of current legal 
discourse—regulation through a one-rule-fits-all policy—is flawed. 
IV.  ANY ONE-RULE-FITS-ALL POLICY IS INAPPROPRIATE: FURTHER 
INDICATIONS 
Agency analysis indicates no single approach is preferable in all 
situations.  This Part further strengthens that conclusion.  First, it examines 
claims that there are reasons, other than efficiency concerns, to adopt a 
conditional liability approach as a one-rule-fits-all policy.  Second, it 
addresses the argument that it is especially appropriate to adopt a reduced 
sentence approach as a one-rule-fits-all policy in the realm of international 
law.  Lastly, it points out that not all laws that an order can violate are cut 
from the same cloth; an element that has been ignored in the current 
discourse. This element serves as a further indication the issue should not be 
regulated through a one-rule-fits-all policy.  
A.  Agency Analysis, Excusatory Considerations, and Conditional Liability 
Approaches 
We return to the question that opened this Article.  Why, and when, do we 
want to give soldiers the opportunity to raise a superior orders defense? Is this 
defense useful only because there are situations in which adopting it would 
maximize a lawmaker’s utility?  Or, do we wish to also acknowledge the 
difficulty soldiers face when they are given an order and need to decide 
whether to obey or disobey?  This latter reason suggests we should take into 
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account considerations other than efficiency; namely, the types of 
considerations that allow for excuse defenses (“excusatory considerations”).144  
According to many views, in particular deontological ones, excuse 
defenses should sometimes be adopted even in cases where applying such a 
defense will not serve the lawmaker’s utility.145  Thus, if excusatory 
considerations mandate the adoption of a one-rule-fits-all policy, the 
conclusions of the agency analysis may be superfluous.  In other words, we 
must determine whether an excuse defense must be set in all situations, 
which would mandate the adoption of a different approach than that 
suggested by the agency analysis.  This Subsection will examine the 
excusatory considerations relevant to crimes of obedience in a less abstract 
manner than they are currently examined, as well as the relationship between 
these considerations and the conclusions of the agency analysis.  This 
examination will help us determine whether these excusatory considerations 
support the adoption of a one-rule-fits-all policy, or whether they supply 
further evidence against regulating obedience to orders in such a manner. 
1.  Mistake of Law and the Factual Approach 
One category of situations in which many agree that an excuse defense 
should be afforded is when a person violates the law due to a reasonable 
mistake made following an order of a governmental official.146  Adopting 
such a defense allows courts in each case to separately examine the 
culpability of individuals who followed illegal orders, and to make discrete 
findings that a person should not be held culpable when: (1) she thought the 
order was legal; and (2) that mistake was reasonable.  It is often argued the 
factual approach should be adopted in the context of obedient soldiers, as it 
adapts this more general mistake of law defense to the unique conditions of 
the military.147  If this argument were true, then agency analysis sheds no 
light on the issue, as there will always be an excusatory consideration 
obligating the adoption of the factual approach.  That is, there is an 
                                                                                                                                                       
 144 See supra note 22 (explaining excusatory considerations). 
 145 According to deontological views that strongly influence criminal law jurisprudence, when 
it is unjust to hold a person culpable a criminal law excuse defense should be afforded, even if 
doing so does not serve the lawmaker’s utility.  See sources cited supra notes 96, 101.  
Moreover, many consequentialist views, other than strict utilitarianism, will also support excuse 
defenses in such cases.  See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/lega 
l-punishment. 
 146 See Re’em Segev, Justification, Rationality and Mistake: Mistake of Law Is No Excuse? 
It Might Be a Justification!, 25 L. & PHIL. 31, 32 n.3 (2006) (noting the obviousness and 
general consensus of this view). 
 147 E.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 297; Stanley Yeo, Mistakenly Obeying Unlawful 
Superior Orders, 5 BOND L. REV. 1, 15 (1993). 
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excusatory aim that obligates the lawmaker to allow courts to conduct a case-
by-case examination of subordinates’ culpability, by examining whether (a) 
the individual subordinate soldier thought the order was legal; and whether 
(b) her specific mistake was reasonable. 
However, this argument is false.  There are certain categories of situations 
in which, even from a deontological point of view, the lawmaker can choose 
to bar such individual judicial determinations.148  These situations are ones in 
which there is a moral justification allowing the lawmaker to place a person 
under a duty to learn the law.149  There are two main categories of these 
situations.  
First, it is commonly accepted that all individuals are expected to know 
and learn certain core moral rules that are protected by specific legal 
prohibitions.150  Therefore, a mistake of law defense can be barred in cases 
where orders have led to violations of such norms.  For example, individuals 
who obey orders of governmental officials to commit murder will generally 
be barred from raising a mistake of law defense.  Not only is it unlikely that 
individuals will fail to realize such an order is illegal, or that any mistake will 
not be unreasonable, but allowing individuals to rely on a mistake of law 
defense is fundamentally inappropriate.  “Instead of treating individuals as 
moral agents capable of and responsible for knowing and weighing desirable 
moral values and choices . . . allowing the defense in these situations 
encourages us to cede our moral agency to the state.”151  
Second, in areas which require professional expertise, it is considered 
morally appropriate to deny professionals the same mistake of law defense 
afforded to laymen, since it is an expert’s duty to learn the legal norms 
regulating her profession.152  For example, an accountant should not enjoy 
the same mistake of law defense a layman would be able to enjoy for tax-
related crimes because she has a duty to know the relevant law.153  And 
policemen, it is often argued, cannot enjoy a superior orders defense, even of 
the kind afforded by the factual approach (i.e., they cannot enjoy a mistake 
of law defense for reasonable mistakes made following illegal orders of their 
superiors) because of policemen’s duty to learn and know the law.154 
                                                                                                                                                       
 148 See John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 1, 24–25 (1997) (listing reasons why reliance defense should not be allowed in 
situations that violate central moral values). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 25. 
 151 Id. at 26. 
 152 John Kaplan, Mistake of Law, in 2 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 1125, 1140–45 (1988). 
 153 E.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).  
 154 Doern v. Police Complaint Comm’r, 2001 CarswellBC 1414, ¶ 20 (Can. B.C.C.A.) 
(WL); United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 730–31 (7th Cir. 1953); Brannan v. Peek 
[1948] 1 K.B. 68, at 72 (Eng.).  For the realm of torts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
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The existence of these categories demonstrates there are instances in 
which the factual approach need not be adopted.  First, with respect to certain 
specific acts, it is morally justifiable to mandate all soldiers know that such 
acts are illegal, either because of their professional duties or because such 
acts are obviously immoral.  Second, high ranking officers, as professional 
soldiers, can be mandated to learn the legal norms that regulate their 
profession.  In these two categories of situations, there is no reason to adopt a 
factual approach, and a lawmaker is thus free to determine whether to apply 
another approach based on the agency analysis’ conclusions.155  
Furthermore, there is also a category of situations in which the factual 
approach should not be adopted, even if excusatory considerations are taken 
into account.  Imagine a situation where the agency analysis leads to the 
conclusion that a normative approach should be adopted.  In such situations, 
if this approach, which affords a more extensive defense, is adopted instead 
of the factual approach, the only difference is that even those soldiers who 
knowingly obeyed an illegal order, which is not grossly immoral, will also 
not be prosecuted.  Thus, adopting a more extensive defense will still shield 
those obedient soldiers who have a valid mistake of law excuse defense.  
Therefore, the existence of this excusatory consideration does not 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that the factual approach should be adopted 
in all situations.  This consideration and not the conclusions of the agency 
analysis should determine the content of the law dealing with obedience to 
orders only in the limited situations where (1) this consideration is relevant 
but (2) the agency analysis supports adopting a reduced sentence approach 
(i.e., the only approach more restrictive than the factual approach that is 
likely to sometimes serve a lawmaker’s utility).  Moreover, the fact that this 
excusatory consideration is only relevant in some crimes of obedience 
                                                                                                                                                       
§ 121 cmt. i (1965) (“[N]o protection is given to a peace officer who, however reasonably, 
acts under a mistake of law other than a mistake as to the validity of a statute or ordinance.”). 
 155 Deontological perspectives do not endorse ignoring the consequences of a conduct rule.  
Rather, they argue that a norm should be adopted despite possible harmful consequences if, 
and only if, a strong deontological value exists that trumps the need to take into account such 
consequences.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26–27 (1971).  It should be noted that 
with regard to the first category in which the defense is barred (i.e., violations of core moral 
values), some deontological perspectives will sometimes argue there is a duty to punish the 
obedient subordinate soldier.  See Douglas N. Husak, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism, in 
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 410, 423 (2010) (stating that some versions 
of retribution insist that each and every perpetrator of a moral wrong must be punished); 
Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 413 
(1958) (giving the following as the rationale for baring the mistake of law defense from being 
applied in the context of crimes that prohibit the violation of core moral norms: “[f]or any 
member of the community who does these things without knowing that they are criminal is 
blameworthy, as much for his lack of knowledge as for his actual conduct.”).  
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further indicates it is improper to regulate all crimes of obedience through a 
one-rule-fits-all policy.  
2.  Psychological Coercion and the Normative Approach   
Soldiers may face strong psychological pressure to obey orders, which 
has been well documented by psychological studies.156  In particular, Stanley 
Milgram conducted an experiment where subjects were instructed to provide 
shocks to a man every time he made a mistake.157  All of the subjects ended 
up following the instructor’s commands to give increasingly severe shocks to 
the man, up to 300 volts, even when the man writhed and kicked the wall in 
pain (the man was an actor and did not actually receive electric shocks, but 
subjects were not aware of this fact).158  Sixty-five percent of the subjects 
used the maximum voltage, at which point they were led to believe the man 
had lost consciousness.159   
This research indicates individuals are, at least sometimes, conditioned to 
obey orders, even if they demand the commission of wrongful acts.160  
Moreover, research further indicates military conditions often uniquely 
promote this conditioned behavior of obedience.161  Thus, many agree that 
the coercive pressures a soldier faces should be taken into account when 
formulating a law to deal with crimes of obedience.162  The attempt to 
balance the coercive pressures a soldier faces against the rule of law has led 
some to support the normative approach.163  Furthermore, at first glance the 
research seems to support the adoption of the normative approach, since it 
indicates an individual is less likely to obey an order when it contradicts her 
moral values,164 especially if the act ordered is both illegal and immoral.165 
                                                                                                                                                       
 156 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
371 (1963) (presenting Milgram’s seminal research on obedience); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. 
LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 146–66 (1989) (discussing the psychological researches examining the issue 
of obedience).  
 157 Milgram, supra note 156, at 373–74. 
 158 Id. at 375–76. 
 159 Id. at 374. 
 160 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 205 (1974). 
 161 JEAN-JACQUES FRÉSARD, THE ROOTS OF BEHAVIOUR IN WAR: A SURVEY OF THE 
LITERATURE 82–86 (2004); Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 92–155. 
 162 E.g., Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 156–65; see also V. Lee Hamilton, Intuitive 
Psychologist or Intuitive Lawyer? Alternative Models of the Attribution Process, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 771 (1980) (arguing for greater legal recognition of 
research demonstrating human propensity for obedience). 
 163 Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L. 
REV. 801, 817–18 (1997) (stating this policy is commonly endorsed by prosecutors). 
 164 KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 156, at 92. 
 165 Legally backing the moral norm reduces the likelihood that a psychological process of 
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This seemingly leads to the conclusion there is always an excusatory aim 
that obligates the adoption of the normative approach.  However, research 
reveals the strength of the coercive effect of orders varies among different 
situations.  During emergency situations psychological factors that increase 
the tendency for conditioned obedience are much stronger than in non-
emergency situations.166  Furthermore, there is a correlation between the 
tendency to obey and the strictness of military discipline demanded from a 
soldier.  That is, the tendency for conditioned obedience to orders tends to be 
lower when the discipline required of a soldier is less strict.167  Thus, a 
tendency for conditioned obedience is not likely to exist in the higher ranks 
of the chain of command, where lax discipline is generally practiced.168 
Research also indicates that if a second authoritative body makes a normative 
proclamation that contradicts the wrongful order, subordinates will be less 
likely to obey on impulse and instead will rationally consider the conflicting 
messages.169  Supposedly, a lawmaker sends such a proclamation when the 
law states soldiers should only obey legal orders, or that all grossly immoral, 
illegal orders must be disobeyed.170  The problem, however, is that such 
general messages are often ineffective because soldiers have a limited ability 
to determine whether an order is illegal or grossly immoral.171  Yet, it is still 
likely that more specific laws that delineate categories of orders that should 
be disobeyed will reduce conditioned obedience.172  Thus, this excusatory 
consideration does not lead to the conclusion that the normative approach 
should always be adopted.  However, this excusatory consideration should be 
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taken into account, mainly when addressing low-ranking subordinates in 
emergency situations. 
Thus, there are not any excusatory considerations that mandate the 
adoption of either of the two conditional liability approaches in all instances.  
When the different excusatory considerations are closely examined, we see 
that each is only relevant in a limited set of circumstances.  
B.  Applying the Agency Analysis to the International Arena 
Agency analysis uncovers the main harm of adopting the reduced 
sentence approach as a one-rule-fits-all policy.  Such an approach may lead a 
soldier to (mistakenly) disobey orders beneficial to the lawmaker (i.e., legal 
orders).  Yet, adopting a reduced sentence approach as a one-rule-fits-all 
policy can still lead to maximal utility if the lawmaker never gains from the 
performance of legal orders.  Given the state grants the military the legal 
authority to carry out acts for its benefit,173 it seems obvious that the 
wholesale application of a reduced sentence approach will not have maximal 
utility in practice.  However, some implied that this conclusion only applies 
to domestic law, and a reduced sentence approach can still have maximal 
utility in the realm of international law. 
States are the main lawmakers and enforcers of international law, which 
implies domestic lawmakers are often the real architects of international 
law.174  But, there is a difference between domestic lawmakers’ uses of 
domestic law and their uses of international law.  A state does not need to 
rely on international law to dictate the behavior of its own agents; it can use 
domestic law.  Thus, by trying to convince other states a certain prohibition 
is the international customary law or by agreeing with other states via treaty 
that a certain act is prohibited, a domestic lawmaker attempts to influence the 
behavior of foreign agents.175  Because the core aim of a military is to win 
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wars176 and the disciplined obedience to orders (certainly legal ones) 
facilitates attainment of this aim, it is unlikely a state will be harmed when 
enemy soldiers, in attempting to disobey internationally illegal orders, will 
mistakenly disobey legal ones.  As such, it has been argued that a superior 
orders defense should never be recognized in international law, and instead a 
reduced sentence rule should be adopted in all situations.177  
However, this critique reflects an inaccurate conception of the role of 
international law.  By attempting to advance a certain norm in the 
international arena, a state may actually wish to achieve two goals.  First, a 
state might wish to deter enemy soldiers from violating international 
humanitarian law.178  Second, a state might wish to influence the manner in 
which its own soldiers will be treated by the enemy.179  A reduced sentence 
rule will not always be preferable in light of this second goal.  
If the enemy, or a third state, reciprocates and applies a reduced sentence 
rule when prosecuting the state’s soldiers, the state’s interest in protecting its 
soldiers from foreign prosecution will be undermined.  Moreover, even if the 
state does not wish to protect its own soldiers who commit “war crimes of 
obedience” from foreign prosecution, the state may still be harmed by 
advancing a reduced sentence rule in the international arena.  If other states 
reciprocate and apply a reduced sentence rule when prosecuting the state’s 
soldiers, and if that deters the state’s soldiers, the state is likely to be harmed 
by the mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders that tend to occur under 
a reduced sentence rule.  When these harms outweigh the crime prevention 
gains a state receives under a reduced sentence rule in the international arena, 
a state will attempt to advance an approach that incorporates a superior 
orders defense.  
In other words, as in the domestic context, adopting either a reduced 
sentence rule or a superior orders defense will only sometimes be preferable 
to the other.  Moreover, we can expect that, in many situations, an 
intermediate solution should be adopted, and the kind of intermediate 
solution that should be adopted will vary among different situations. 
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C.  Effects of Discretion in a Subordinate’s Determination of Legality 
The lawmaker is more likely to keep the commander on the “right” path if 
the law consists of clear and detailed rules.  Such rules ensure commanders 
will be less likely to mistakenly violate the law, and clear, detailed rules also 
often make it easier for the lawmaker to recognize when the commander 
violates the law.180 
Compare the following two laws: (1) destruction of a religious site is 
forbidden unless the enemy is conducting an attack from that site; and (2) 
destruction of civilian property is not allowed unless some military necessity 
exists that justifies its destruction.  To determine whether the commander 
violated the first law (i.e., a legal rule delegating a task to the commander), 
only two factual issues need to be determined: (1) Was the attacked site a 
religious site?; and (2) Did the enemy launch an attack from that site?  On 
the other hand, to determine whether the commander violated the second law 
(i.e., a legal norm delegating discretion to the commander), the lawmaker 
needs to know what constitutes “military necessity,” in addition to the 
examination of the relevant factual questions.  This can be hard to determine 
for a person who is not a military expert. 
Moreover, the lawmaker’s lack of expertise is also often the reason why 
clear legal rules are not always used in the first place.181  An individual agent 
is often better equipped than the lawmaker to determine what actions will 
maximize the lawmaker’s utility.182  Accordingly, vast areas of the law are 
legislated in a way that accords discretion to agents.  This is most notably the 
case with regards to administrative laws183 and laws that deal with 
emergency situations.184  Furthermore, this is also the case with negligence 
laws, which necessarily grant discretion to individual actors to determine 
what is reasonable.185  Yet, due to differences in expertise, when the law is 
discretionary the lawmaker is faced with a problem.  The lawmaker lacks “an 
effective means of reversing the agent’s decisions . . . . [T]he agent is chosen 
because of expertise, so the principal must acquire expertise or hire another 
expert to evaluate and then alter the agent’s choice.”186 
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When a lawmaker instructs a subordinate to disobey illegal orders, she 
attempts to utilize the subordinate to evaluate and then alter the commander’s 
choices.  Interestingly, for reasons that will now be explained, the likelihood 
a subordinate will correctly recognize whether an order is illegal is 
influenced by whether a commander was given discretion in the first place.  
If the commander was not given discretion and only concrete tasks have been 
delegated to the commander, a subordinate’s duty is relatively limited in 
scope.  She is only expected to know the relevant rules set by the lawmaker 
and act accordingly.  But, if a commander is given discretion, in addition to 
being required to know the relevant law, the subordinate needs to make an 
independent assessment of her commander’s judgment to determine whether 
an order is legal.  For example, she needs to assess whether there is a 
“military necessity” to destroy the civilian property to determine whether 
that order is legal.  In this situation, placing the subordinate under a duty to 
review the superior’s orders gives the subordinate the concomitant discretion 
to determine whether the act ordered should be performed.  
Yet, this latter scenario presents a problem because a commander is likely 
to possess better resources, knowledge, and skills.187  Therefore, placing the 
subordinate under a duty to review the superior’s orders is likely to yield 
results that do not serve the lawmaker’s goals because it delegates discretion 
to a less qualified agent.  Accordingly, a legal policy instructing the 
subordinate to disobey illegal orders is often more likely to cause mistakes, 
(i.e., disobedience of legal orders and obedience to illegal ones), when the 
law that determines whether the order is legal is one that delegates discretion 
to the commander.  Moreover, as the difference in capability and skills 
between subordinate and commander increases, so too does the likelihood 
that instructing a subordinate to disobey illegal orders will result in mistakes.  
An example of this can be seen in the recent Canadian case of R. v. 
Liwyj.188  Liwyj, a vehicle technician, received an order to perform a brake 
adjustment on a vehicle without caging bolts.  He refused to do so under the 
belief that it was unsafe, even though his more qualified commanders 
determined it was safe.  Liwyj was prosecuted for disobedience and argued 
the order was illegal because the army’s “Safety Directive” instructed 
soldiers to stop unsafe activities.189  The court wished to set a legal policy 
that would defer to commanders’ determinations.  The court did so by 
                                                                                                                                                       
1651, 1704 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  
 187 Lippman, supra note 20, at 248; Re’em Segev, Moral Justification, Administrative Power 
and Emergencies, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 629, 654 (2005). 
 188 R. v. Liwyj, 2010 CarswellNat 4984 (Can. Ct. Martial App. Ct.) (WL). 
 189 Id. ¶¶ 2–9, 33. 
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finding Liwyj guilty and adopting a normative approach (i.e., by instructing 
soldiers to knowingly obey even some illegal orders).190  
In requiring a subordinate to review the legality of her commanders’ 
orders, the greatest negative effect will occur when the law allows the 
commander to infringe upon general legal rules in exceptional situations. 
These legal exceptions almost always are allowed to be employed by agents 
only in emergency situations.191  Furthermore, such legal norms are, usually, 
based on a very strict lesser-evil rationale.192  That is, these laws instruct the 
relevant agents to use such legal authority given to them as a last resort to be 
used only in exceptional situations.193  Placing a subordinate under a duty to 
review the legality of her commander’s orders in such situations requires the 
subordinate to independently assess whether the generally prohibited conduct 
should nevertheless be allowed under the circumstances.  Because the law 
instructs individuals to view the infringement of the general legal rule as an 
act allowed only in exceptional (usually emergency) situations, a subordinate 
may tend to err on the side of disobeying an “infringing” order.  Thus, 
because a superior will likely have more information and expertise, asking a 
subordinate to review a superior’s orders in emergency situations may lead 
soldiers to often mistakenly disobey legal orders.194  
A 2008 Israeli case illustrated this problem.195  Israeli law forbids the 
export of medicine without the Health Ministry’s approval.  The Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF) decided to send medical supplies to the Palestinian 
authorities so that they would be able to treat civilians injured during combat 
in Gaza.  Due to the urgent need to deliver the medication, the IDF made the 
delivery without first seeking the approval of the Health Ministry.  At the 
border, the IDF asked the head of the Israeli customs unit to allow the 
convoy to pass.  He agreed, yet one of his subordinates refused to allow the 
trucks to pass because the Health Ministry had not given its approval, even 
though he was explicitly ordered to do so by his superior.196  When tried for 
disobedience, the subordinate claimed that the order was illegal and that 
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serious health risks could occur if medication was exported without the 
Health Ministry’s prior approval.197  The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the 
order was legal because of the existence of “necessity,” stressing the fact that 
the decision was made by much higher ranked and better qualified state 
agents than the subordinate.198  The court wished to set a policy that would 
lead the superiors’ determinations to be preferred, and thus ruled in support 
of the normative approach.199  
In sum, it is likely that a rule encouraging disobedience to unlawful 
orders will cause more mistakes when the law at issue is discretionary, and 
especially when that law is one that regulates emergency situations.  
Moreover, the considerations a lawmaker faces when constructing a policy to 
govern crimes of obedience differ depending on which law the orders are 
expected to violate.  If the law sets clear rules, the lawmaker needs to assess 
the subordinate’s ability to learn these rules.  If the law affords discretion to 
the commander, the lawmaker needs to assess the subordinate’s expertise in 
the issue regulated by the law.  Current legal discourse has ignored the 
existence of this difference, yet this difference further indicates different 
crimes of obedience should be treated differently. 
V.  SOLUTION—A MODULAR POLICY  
In light of the failure of current attempts to regulate crimes of obedience, 
this Section offers an alternative. Instead of a one-rule-fits-all policy, a 
modular one should be adopted.  Legal solutions should be tailored to 
accommodate the varied situations in which military orders are given. 
A.  Choosing a Fragmentation Level  
According to agency analysis, the factors that should be considered when 
determining how to regulate crimes of obedience depend heavily on the 
situation in which the order was given.  As such, it is inappropriate to 
regulate the issue via a one-rule-fits-all policy.  This subsection thus 
examines the alternatives to the application of such a policy.  It rules out the 
option of letting the relevant decision makers regulate the issue on a case-by-
case basis.  It then advocates for a new approach, which would divide crimes 
of obedience into narrower, discernible categories, each governed by a 
different policy. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 197 Id. ¶ D. 
 198 Id. ¶ G(7). 
 199 Id. ¶¶ G(1)–(7). 
46  GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 41:1  
1.  Case-by-Case Regulation is Inappropriate  
The lack of consensus about how to regulate crimes of obedience is not 
merely the result of disagreement among supporters of different approaches.  
Instead, as this Article uncovers, a more fundamental problem plagues the 
current discourse on this subject.  Contrary to current consensual premise, 
there is, in fact, not one approach that is appropriate in all situations. 
For practical purposes, one might therefore argue that it is appropriate to 
allow the law to be as vague as it currently is because it enables courts,200 as 
well as states with respect to international law,201 to regulate crimes of 
obedience on a case-by-case basis.  Furthermore, there is some evidence 
indicating courts tend to rule in particular ways depending on the type of 
situation presented.202  Similarly, other evidence suggests the shifting nature 
of reciprocity is one reason for international law’s inconsistency with respect 
to the law governing crimes of obedience.203  In other words, one may argue 
there is not, truly, a problem of inconsistency in the current law, and current 
legal vagueness actually enables treating different cases differently.    
Yet, such a claim exaggerates the positive effects of current legal 
vagueness (i.e., it is both descriptively and normatively flawed).  As a 
descriptive matter, case law of many legal systems clearly shows that the 
case-by-case discretion made possible by current legal uncertainty leads to 
substantial legal inconsistencies when evaluating crimes of obedience, and 
causes similar cases to be treated differently.204   
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As a normative matter as well, as explained hereinafter, courts should not 
be afforded such discretion by domestic or international law when dealing 
with obedience to illegal orders.  Nor should international law allow such 
discretion to states. 
Assessing the considerations relevant to the issue of obedience to illegal 
order is not an exact science.  Judges necessarily vary in their assessments, 
and thus similar cases are often not treated similarly, which creates a fairness 
problem.205  This variation reduces the likelihood of developing clear rules 
ex ante. As such, a fair-notice problem is created as well.206  Moreover, since 
such a policy fails to create clear instructions for soldiers, it leads to 
inefficiencies.  Agency analysis shows that a lawmaker should take into 
consideration the probability a subordinate will correctly obey or disobey 
orders as instructed.207  Choosing a legal policy that sends a convoluted 
message is therefore counterproductive, given that it increases the probability 
subordinates will obey when the lawmaker would wish them to disobey and 
vice versa. 
Similarly, it is unjust to allow states to determine the international law 
regarding crimes of obedience according to the level of reciprocity between 
the states involved in a specific conflict.  A person’s culpability for war 
crimes should be determined by her actions, not based on the identity of her 
state or the identity of the tribunal in which she is prosecuted.208  
Moreover, increased support for complementarity mechanisms and the 
use of universal jurisdiction indicate that allowing states such discretion is 
inefficient.  States can choose not to adopt a general prohibition, which 
would force regulation to be necessarily restricted to a specific conflict and 
dependent on the aims and capabilities of the specific states involved in that 
conflict.209  The adoption of a general prohibition (i.e., declaring a certain act 
prohibited by international criminal law) is achieved, however, when states 
attempt to maximize their utility in the long run.210  During multilateral 
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negotiations, most states involved are usually those that have not recently 
been, are not currently, and do not anticipate being involved in armed 
conflict.211  Because these states are not engaged in an armed conflict, they 
are less likely to inject case-specific, self-serving concerns into the drafting 
process.212  Instead, the process becomes more focused on whether the long-
term harm states can expect to suffer without an international prohibition on 
certain conduct is greater than the long-term gains states can expect from 
having their agents perform that conduct.  Thus, this decisionmaking process 
has the potential to be as close as practically possible to one made under a 
veil of ignorance.213  
However, if the rules of enforcement are allowed to vary between 
conflicts, states’ attempt to maximize their utility in the long run will fail.  
“[T]rying individual violators from other states during wartime is likely to 
lead to reciprocal spirals between states rather than deterrence of individual 
violations” since “[s]tates at war cannot demonstrate to one another that such 
trials are fair.”214  When a reciprocal spiral occurs, each state retaliates by 
further punishing soldiers of the other side, as well as by violating other 
international norms in reprisal.215  Such retaliation may lead to a vicious 
circle and an abandonment of international legal norms that both states wish 
to maintain.216  Moreover, the concern about a reciprocal spiral often leads to 
an opposite result, such that states avoid prosecuting enemy soldiers who 
commit war crimes in fear of reprisal by foreign states.217  Thus, relying on 
the interests of individual states in each conflict to enforce the prohibitions of 
international criminal law will often lead to failure.  
Some of these problems can be resolved by employing universal 
jurisdiction.  Universal jurisdiction minimizes the concern that prohibitions 
of international criminal law will not be enforced, since the abdication of any 
one state of its authority to prosecute will not prevent other parties from 
initiating prosecution.218  However, a state might still view the prosecution of 
its soldiers by a foreign state as unfair, and thus a reciprocal spiral might still 
occur.219  This concern is resolved by allowing prosecution by foreign states 
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to be used only as a complementary enforcement mechanism,220 such that 
each state holds the primary responsibility for prosecuting its own soldiers 
and foreign states are allowed to step in only when the state fails to enforce 
international criminal law and prosecute its own soldiers.221  Under such a 
legal regime, states’ ability to abuse their authority to prosecute enemy 
soldiers is reduced.  At the same time, each state still has a strong incentive 
to prevent and punish international crimes committed by its own soldiers.  
Therefore, the likelihood a state would conclude a belligerent is shirking its 
international obligations decreases, thereby reducing the likelihood a 
reciprocal spiral will ensue.222  
However, this enforcement mechanism cannot work if the norms that 
determine the responsibility of individuals, such as the norms that determine 
the responsibility of subordinates for crimes of obedience, are determined by 
each state based on its interests in each specific conflict.  If such norms are 
not set ex ante, states will never be able to demonstrate to one another that 
their prosecution of foreign soldiers is fair or that their decision not to punish 
their own soldiers is done in good faith.223  Further, the necessary fairness 
cannot be demonstrated, even if international standards for individual 
criminal responsibility have been adopted ex ante, if states are allowed to 
diverge from them and apply harsher standards in cases in which they are 
prosecuting foreign soldiers for international crimes.  Similarly, the 
necessary good faith cannot be demonstrated, if states are allowed to apply 
laxer standards than the international ones in cases where they are 
prosecuting their own soldiers for international crimes.  Without such general 
applicability of international standards that are set ex ante reciprocal spirals 
                                                                                                                                                       
the UN Genocide Convention was opposed due to a “deep-rooted mistrust [by each state] of 
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Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 839, 842, 850–51, 856 (2002) (distinguishing between “primary rules,” 
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rules because irrespective of their substantive interest in each case, states have a joint interest 
to clarify which acts should be considered as violations in order to facilitate reliable 
communication and prevent mistaken acts of retaliation).  
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will not be prevented.  An international law dealing with crimes of obedience 
should, therefore, be one that attempts to maximize a state’s utility in the 
long run, and accordingly it should be based on a decision-making process 
that resembles one made behind a veil of ignorance.  
Behind this veil of ignorance, several issues should be viewed as 
preconditions (i.e., as issues already agreed upon by the states).  Mainly, it 
should be assumed that states have accepted the substantive criminal act is 
harmful in the long run, and further agreed not to apply, with respect to war 
crimes of obedience, a laxer standard of individual responsibility on their 
own soldiers, or a harsher stranded on foreign soldiers, than the one they 
adopt as the international standard on the matter.  Also, as it is a decision 
made behind a veil of ignorance, we need to assume that states do not know 
whether they will be the ones prosecuting foreign soldiers or whether their 
own soldiers will be prosecuted by others.  Thus, differences in states’ ability 
to retaliate can be negated.224  Therefore, in international law as in domestic 
law, the determination of the proper legal policy to deal with crimes of 
obedience should be made by weighing the crime prevention benefits of 
holding subordinate soldiers accountable against the harm caused by 
mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders if subordinates are held 
accountable.  
In sum, although a single rule should not be applied to all cases, we 
should also not allow courts or states unfettered discretion to regulate crimes 
of obedience on a case-by-case basis.  Justice and efficiency demand that 
courts, states, and soldiers be guided by clear legal rules set ex ante.225  
2.  Choosing the Proper Level of Specification 
While laws are necessarily general in nature, there is a limit on the level 
of generalization that is appropriate.226  The more general a law is, the more 
inefficient it will be due to over-inclusiveness.  Instead of each issue being 
regulated by a legal norm tailored to efficiently deal with that issue, different 
issues are all regulated in a single manner by one legal norm.  This leads to 
an excessive number of cases where the optimal result is not reached.227  
                                                                                                                                                       
 224 See David Rodin, The Liability of Ordinary Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, 6 WASH. 
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Moreover, an overly generalized law forces framers to use abstract terms 
(such as the term “manifestly unlawful orders”), which leads to legal 
uncertainty.228   
But in an overly fragmented legal scheme, the likelihood for legal 
uncertainty also increases. In such a law, this is due to an increased 
likelihood that an overlap will exist between definitions of different 
categories.229  Additionally, the more detailed a law is, the more costly it is to 
draft and teach to the relevant agents.230  Thus, at a certain point, 
specification will lead to suboptimal results, legal uncertainty, or both. 
How should the level of specification be determined?  A lawmaker could 
examine each individual case in an attempt to find similarities between cases 
and then divide the issue into categories based on those perceived 
similarities.231  But this method would be too costly, if not impossible, to 
implement, and it would often prove difficult to objectively determine what 
constitutes a similarity.232  A better way of subdividing while maintaining 
clear distinctions between legal categories would be to have the categories 
track the way the social issues the lawmaker wishes to regulate are divided 
and subdivided in practice.233  Doing so would make the boundaries between 
categories more straightforward and less disputed because the new legal 
categories would reflect common cultural understandings.234  As such, the 
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existence of a common understanding is likely to reduce legal uncertainty.  
Moreover, such an approach has proved to be the “most effective and secure 
way of handling legal problems”235 by shaping legal rules in a way that is 
“close and contemporary” to the human problems they deal with.236 
Because cultural understanding varies amongst legal societies, this Article 
will only be able to offer a general model legal policy based on common 
features present in modern militaries.237  However, these common features 
could serve as the basis for the advised level of specification when 
addressing crimes of obedience in international law, because the shared 
cultural background is limited in the international arena and the laws of war 
are often phrased based on a common denominator all states can agree 
upon.238  As to domestic law, before adopting the suggested policy in any 
specific legal system, the model policy should first be adapted to 
accommodate the cultural background of that specific society.  However, the 
common experience of modern militaries does expose several important 
divisions regarding military discipline. 
It was once believed military discipline would be harmed unless a rule 
favoring unquestioning obedience at all times was adopted.239  However, 
support for the respondeat superior approach has been abandoned, and 
military discipline has since become much less rigid.240  Despite such 
changes, it is still often argued that because “discipline is embedded in all 
areas of military life and activity,” there is “no ability to sort it or to divide it 
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according to issues,”241 and thus a one-rule-fits-all policy should be 
adopted.242   
But this claim is inaccurate and misleading. Modern military forces have 
in fact recognized two major distinctions in the levels of discipline that 
should be applied.  There are differences between: (1) higher and lower 
ranking soldiers;243 and (2) routine and emergency situations.244  Therefore, a 
legal policy that recognizes these distinctions is likely to increase efficiency 
while decreasing legal uncertainty.  Thus, these distinctions should guide the 
way crimes of obedience are addressed. 
B.  Criminal Orders in Non-Emergency Situations 
Criminal conduct is strongly regulated by rules and not discretionary legal 
norms, due in part to the strong fair-notice considerations the subject 
raises.245  There are only a few exceptions to the rule-based regulation of the 
field, namely norms of criminal law governing emergency situations246 and 
negligence offenses.247  Outside of these exceptions, not much discretion is 
delegated to the individual.  As such, a legal policy which instructs 
subordinates to disobey an order that violates a penal prohibition does not 
require the subordinates to exercise much discretion when the order does not 
concern a negligence offense and is not given in an emergency situation.248  
Moreover, in non-emergency situations, subordinates and commanders will 
often have the same general access to relevant legal and factual 
information.249  And, even if the commander initially has more information, 
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often there will not be a heightened need to either maintain secrecy250 or 
respond immediately.251  Thus, the legal and factual basis for the order can 
be explained to the subordinate.  Therefore, in this context, adopting a legal 
rule that instructs subordinates to disobey illegal orders is not likely to cause 
a significant increase in the number of mistaken acts of disobedience to legal 
orders or obedience to illegal ones.  In non-emergency situations, lawmakers 
should thus adopt a rule demanding subordinates of all ranks to disobey 
orders that violate penal prohibitions, when such prohibitions are not 
negligence offenses. 
As such, either the factual conditional liability approach or the reduced 
sentence approach should be adopted here.  The difference between these 
two policies, as previously discussed, lies in the level of doubt regarding an 
order’s legality that will lead a soldier to disobey an order.252  Because we 
can assume an information gap will still exist between low-ranking 
subordinates and commanders, adopting a factual approach will be more 
efficient with regard to low-ranking subordinates.  Such an approach would 
provide a limited incentive to these subordinates to err on the side of 
obedience.  Moreover, because of asymmetric access to information, we can 
expect low-ranking subordinates to rely on their commanders’ legal 
determinations.  Thus, excusatory considerations also support the adoption of 
a reasonable mistake defense for obedience to illegal orders.  Of course, it is 
certainly possible there are subcategories of non-emergency situations in 
which the factual approach would not maximize the lawmaker’s utility.  
However, an overly detailed legal policy is likely to cause a myriad of 
harms.253  Therefore, the factual approach should still be used in a majority 
of non-emergency situations. 
As for high-ranking subordinates, the information gap is expected to be 
much narrower.254  Thus, a strong argument can be made for a reduced 
sentence approach.  However, the decision to employ a reduced sentence 
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approach over a factual approach should be left to the lawmakers of each 
specific legal system after considering the actual information gap between 
high-ranking subordinates and their commanders in that specific legal 
system. 
Let us examine a main advantage of adopting a factual approach or a 
reduced sentence approach over adopting a normative approach.  A 
normative conditional liability approach encourages an almost reflexive sort 
of obedience.255  On the other hand, both a factual approach and a reduced 
sentence approach give a subordinate more freedom to express her concerns 
that the order is illegal.  During non-emergency situations, the delay caused 
by allowing the subordinate to express such concerns is not likely to lead to 
severe harm.  Moreover, it can prevent crimes as well as decrease mistaken 
acts of disobedience to legal orders.  A subordinate is likely to obey if, after a 
short dialogue, the legal basis of the order is explained to her.  Similarly, a 
commander who gives a criminal order by mistake can correct herself if a 
careful subordinate takes the time to point it out.  Even a commander who 
intentionally gives an illegal order is often likely to amend it once the 
illegality of the order is exposed.  Thus, in most non-emergency situations, a 
normative approach will not best serve the lawmaker’s utility.  
C.  Other Illegal Orders 
Orders can also be illegal because they violate either administrative legal 
norms or negligence offenses.256  Obligating subordinates to disobey illegal 
orders that violate such laws raises unique concerns.  First, since these laws 
are often discretionary in nature, a legal policy that instructs subordinates to 
disobey an order that violates such laws will delegate extensive discretion to 
the subordinate, which will in turn increase the likelihood mistakes will 
occur.257  Second, since the punishment for violating such laws is usually not 
severe, the lawmaker’s ability to deter subordinates from obeying such 
illegal orders is limited.  Third, subordinates are even less likely to be 
cognizant of the relevant law in this context.258  Fourth, we can often expect 
less harm to be caused by the violation of such laws.259  Yet, there is a strong 
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reason for instructing subordinates to disobey such orders.  Due to the 
harshness of criminal law sanctions and the cost of their enforcement, the 
lawmaker often resorts to administrative law to direct her agents’ actions.260  
Therefore, encouraging subordinates to obey such illegal orders can lead to 
massive violations of administrative law, which can considerably diminish 
the lawmaker’s ability to control her military agents.  
These different concerns can properly be taken into account if the law 
distinguishes between low-ranking and high-ranking soldiers.261  In the 
military, as in any hierarchical body, general policies are determined by 
high-ranking officials.  Thus, obligating high-ranking soldiers to disobey 
orders that violate administrative and negligence legal norms will allow the 
lawmaker to retain sufficient control over the policies of the military.262  
Secondly, because high-ranking soldiers are military professionals, they can 
be expected to familiarize themselves with the reasonable practices and 
administrative procedures that govern their profession.  Third, administrative 
and disciplinary sanctions have greater deterrent effect when carried out 
against a professional career officer than when carried out against a low-
ranking soldier who views military service as a short and temporary 
experience.263  Therefore, high-ranking soldiers should be instructed to only 
obey such legal orders (i.e., to disobey such illegal orders), whereas low-
ranking subordinates should be instructed to obey all such orders.   
D.  Orders Given in Emergency Situations 
In emergency situations, disobeying a legal order can endanger lives and 
thwart legitimate operations.264  Also, there are certain concerns that are 
uniquely strong in emergency situations, such as the need to respond 
immediately and maintain secrecy, which constrain a commander’s ability to 
explain an order’s legal basis to a subordinate.265  Furthermore, instructing 
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low-ranking subordinates to disobey orders will often be ineffective, since 
low-ranking subordinates are more likely to develop a strong psychological 
tendency to obey orders in emergency situations, regardless of an order’s 
legality.266 
Moreover, even if low-ranking subordinates do not develop a conditioned 
tendency to “automatically” obey orders, their attempt to rationally assess 
whether an order is illegal will be very likely to result in a mistaken 
conclusion.  That is because emergencies are regulated by discretionary legal 
norms, and most legal rules may be infringed upon in emergency 
situations.267  This is not to say that individuals are given unlimited 
discretion in emergencies, but flexibility is necessary when dealing with 
emergency situations.  Since emergencies are difficult to plan for, often the 
most the law can do to govern such situations is to adopt limits that guide 
and structure an agent’s discretion, as opposed to bright-line conduct rules.268 
That is, the law does not tell the relevant agent how exactly to act, instead it 
tells the agent which consideration she should, and should not, take into 
account, and it also gives the agent some instructions on how to assess and 
balance the relevant considerations.   
For example, some of these norms limit the discretion of the agent mainly 
by demanding there must be necessity to perform the infringing act,269 
allowing the infringing act only if it causes harm that is proportional to the 
benefits that will be attained by it,270 or only allowing the use of reasonable 
force when committing the infringing act.271   
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Agency analysis indicates that when the legality of an order depends on 
the violation of a discretionary emergency law, it is much more likely that 
subordinates will mistakenly disobey legal orders if they are instructed to 
disobey illegal ones.272  Thus, it seems that an obedience rule that 
incorporates a strong superior orders defense is the most optimal legal 
policy.  Yet, as explained hereinafter, we can make an even finer distinction 
based on the current disciplinary policy of modern militaries.  
An order is, essentially, an act which delegates a task to a subordinate.  
When we think of an order, we think of a narrow directive that is not 
preceded by any explanation—a subordinate is told exactly what to do, such 
that she has very little discretion as to how to carry out the order (hereinafter 
strict orders).273  This brusqueness can often increase efficiency and reduce 
mistakes because it leaves all authority in the hands of a single agent.  This 
means of communication will thus often be the most appropriate in 
emergencies, and as such, lawmakers delegate to military commanders the 
authority to give such orders to their subordinates.274 
However, reliance on strict orders is not always the best course of action.  
Emergency situations present an environment in which conditions can 
rapidly change.  Subordinates on the field are often the first to observe these 
changes as they develop.  Attempts by the subordinate to transmit 
information to her superior in real-time often fail,275 and reliance on strict 
orders leaves the subordinate with little room to respond to new 
developments.276  Furthermore, the assumption that the commander, as an 
expert, is the optimal decision maker is based on the notion that experts are 
better equipped to properly assess macro-level considerations (such as long 
term effects and considerations that arise from the larger context in which the 
specific act is performed).277  Yet, experience has revealed that in many 
emergency situations this ability to take into account the big picture does not 
lead commanders to reach better decisions.  Instead, an attempt to factor in 
these macro-level considerations can overwhelm even an expert decision 
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maker.278 Therefore, allowing subordinates to examine each concrete act 
separately, even though they tend to negate macro-level considerations, has 
often proven to be more effective.279  
Due to these problems posed by strict orders, modern militaries have 
adopted mission orders as an alternative means of communication.280  
According to the mission orders doctrine, a commander must first assess the 
big picture and then issue a “mission order” to the subordinate based on that 
assessment.  The mission order (unlike a strict order) must include the 
following: an explanation of the reasons behind the order, a definition of 
mission objections, and a set of limitations the commander wishes to place 
on the ways a subordinate could achieve those objectives.281  Beyond setting 
limitations, this doctrine allows the subordinate to exercise discretion in 
determining how to accomplish the mission.282  Moreover, it encourages the 
subordinate to adapt the mission orders and even act contrary to orders if the 
orders do “not appear consistent with the developing situation.”283  
Yet, the mission orders doctrine has downsides.  As discretion is 
delegated further down the chain of command to less experienced soldiers, 
more mistakes will be made.  The cost-benefit analysis has thus led modern 
militaries to adopt mission orders,284 but, only when certain characteristics 
are present in the commander-subordinate relationship; namely: (1) the 
difference between each individual’s level of expertise and access to 
information must not be too extensive; and (2) both subordinate and 
commander must share a common professional perspective,285 which 
promotes trust and reduces the likelihood the subordinate and superior will 
interpret orders differently, or otherwise make contradictory decisions.286  
                                                                                                                                                       
 278 Jordan, supra note 275, at 6.  
 279 Id. at 6–9.  
 280 Robert Egnell, Civil-Military Aspects of Effectiveness in Peace Support Operations, in 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD OF WAR AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 122, 127 
(Kobi Michael et al. eds., 2009). 
 281 John D. Johnson, Mission Orders in the United States Army: Is the Doctrine Effective?, 14  
(June 1, 1990) (M.M.A.S. Thesis, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College), available at  
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA242667;  
Gene C. Kamena, Mission Orders: Is Intent the Answer?, 2–10, 15, 17, 33 (Dec. 30, 1992) 
(M.M.A.S. Thesis, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College).  
 282 Johnson, supra note 281, at 20, 23–24; Jordan, supra note 275, at 11–12. 
 283 Jordan, supra note 275, at 5 (quoting Charles Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier: 
Scharnhorst and the Militarische Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801–1805, at 23 (1986) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Duke University)); see also Johnson, supra note 281, at 12, 14, 17 (explaining the 
ends are more important than the means under the mission orders doctrine).  
 284 Jordan, supra note 275, at 11–12. 
 285 That is, a common professional language, knowledge, and background, and a common 
understanding of military doctrines. 
 286 Jordan, supra note 275, at 8–10; see also Johnson, supra note 281, at 12, 14, 17, 24 
(explaining the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and decentralized command).  
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Because both of these characteristics are generally present only when both 
commander and subordinate are high-ranking officers,287 the mission orders 
doctrine is not, and should not be, the main means of communication 
amongst the lower ranks.  It should be noted that not all orders given to high-
ranking subordinates are mission orders.  Yet, even when a high-ranking 
subordinate officer initially receives a strict order, it is very likely that the 
commander will respect the subordinate’s attempts to clarify the order, 
thereby facilitating more dialogue.  
Thus, in light of the capabilities of high-ranking subordinates and the 
discretion commonly afforded to them after receiving an order, high-ranking 
subordinates can and should be instructed to disobey illegal orders in 
emergency situations.  Even though such a disobedience-rule delegates 
discretion to subordinates, it is likely to cause only a moderate number of 
errors.  Importantly, modern armed forces seem to have accepted this 
moderate risk, as demonstrated by their use of the mission orders doctrine.288  
As such, with respect to high-ranking subordinates, it would be 
appropriate either to adopt a reduced sentence approach or to afford them a 
superior orders defense of the kind advanced by the factual approach.  
Lawmakers should choose between the two based upon the extent to which 
their high-ranking subordinates can be demanded and expected to always 
know the law and recognize illegal orders, even in emergency situations.289  
At a minimum, a reduced sentence approach should be adopted for members 
of the “General Staff,” because the discretion afforded to these very high-
ranking subordinates is uniquely extensive290 and the difference in 
knowledge and expertise between such subordinates and their superiors is 
uniquely small.291 
A reduced sentence approach or a factual approach should not be applied, 
however, to low-ranking soldiers, as their lack of expertise and information 
                                                                                                                                                       
 287 Johnson, supra note 281 passim; Cowan, supra note 276 passim.  Of course, cultural 
variation exists in the adoption of this doctrine.  See Paul Johnston, Doctrine Is Not Enough: 
The Effects of Doctrine in the Behavior of Armies, PARAMETERS, Autumn 2000, at 30 
(discussing the influence of culture on the implementation of the same military doctrine in 
different armed forces).  Accordingly, in some armed forces, mission orders are often used 
even at the level of the battalion commander, and in others they are only commonly used at 
ranks higher than division commander. 
 288 See Jordan, supra note 275, at 5; see also Johnson, supra note 281, at 12, 14, 17, 24. 
 289 See Kaplan, supra note 152. 
 290 McCoubrey, supra note 58, at 389; Sloane, supra note 168, at 64. 
 291 Moreover, in relations between members of the “General Staff” and their civilian 
superiors we can expect the military subordinates to have better knowledge and more 
expertise than their superiors, in both the relevant law and matters of military necessity.  See 
HUNTINGTON, supra note 237, at 77–78 (noting the military commander has greater ability to 
ascertain the legal consequences of battlefield orders). 
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will often lead them to mistakenly disobey legal orders.292  Moreover, even a 
normative approach will not help prevent this problem because “[a]n act that 
seems to the uninformed as manifestly wrong may actually be morally 
justified.”293 
Adopting a conditional liability approach can also lead to the opposite 
problem of encouraging massive obedience to illegal orders.  Due to the 
psychological conditions that exist during emergencies, low-ranking 
subordinates often do not critically examine the legality or morality of an 
order.  This is true even if they are instructed by law to do so, and even if 
they would, in retrospect, acknowledge the ordered acts were severely 
immoral and clearly illegal.  Therefore, they often tend to “automatically” 
obey illegal and immoral orders in times of emergency.294 
Thus, the proper course of action is to further fragment the issue by 
formulating a list of more specific disobedience-rules. Similar to the way a 
normative approach attempts to serve the lawmaker’s utility,295 each rule 
should be adopted if the illegal act it attempts to prevent is easily recognized 
even by low-ranking subordinates, and the act is also extremely harmful. 
Yet, unlike a general instruction to disobey all illegal orders that are also 
grossly immoral, the lawmaker can use a list of specific rules to teach 
soldiers certain acts are illegal.  This list will thus reduce conditioned 
obedience,296 and if the lawmaker takes care to restrict the list of rules to a 
reasonable number, even low-ranking soldiers can be expected to know the 
list and recognize when an order violates one of the rules.297  
We see this in practice, even today, as military manuals often list certain 
illegal acts that should be disobeyed in all circumstances,298 and courts-
martials rule that certain acts should always be disobeyed.299  Moreover, in 
specific emergency situations, soldiers are sometimes handed a document 
listing certain acts as generally forbidden, in an attempt to help low-ranking 
subordinates determine how to act when discretionary emergency laws allow 
                                                                                                                                                       
 292 Wasserstrom, supra note 137, at 202; see also OSIEL, supra note 10, at 64. 
 293 Medina, supra note 140, at 82. 
 294 OSIEL, supra note 10, at 241 n.21; see also supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing the increased 
psychological tendency to obey orders during emergencies). 
 295 See supra notes 139, 141 and accompanying text. 
 296 See supra Part IV.A.2.  
 297 See supra notes 152, 230. 
 298 See, e.g., Dep’t of Army, Your Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War, Army Field 
Manual 27-2, 1984, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/conduct-in-com 
bat-1984.pdf; 2(2) JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE 3803–04 (2005). 
 299 E.g., Bohrer, supra note 37, at 239–40; see also United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 
1237–38 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (“[T]he order of a superior officer to take the life of a citizen, or to 
invade the sanctity of his house and to deprive him of his property, would not shield the 
inferior against a charge of murder or trespass. . . .”). 
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infringement on general prohibitions.300  Such documents attempt to solve 
these subordinates’ difficulty in the following manner: Instead of being 
demanded to assess the necessity, proportionality, or reasonableness of an act 
ordered (i.e., the benchmarks according to different emergency norms for 
determining whether the act ordered is legal),301 subordinates are given a list 
of acts they must never perform, even if ordered.  Furthermore, there are also 
rules set for specific categories of subordinates.302  
However, currently legal systems do not consistently rely on such lists 
due to a concern, raised by some, that doing so will be both underinclusive 
and overinclusive.303  Thus, even within the same legal system, conflicting 
rulings can be found amongst different courts that support a normative 
approach.  Some state that certain acts should always be disobeyed, while 
others hold that the determination of whether an illegal order is grossly 
immoral should always be case specific, and therefore should not always be 
disobeyed.304  
However, in light of the failure of current approaches, relying on a list of 
disobedience-rules should be strongly and consistently encouraged.  Whether 
the list would be overinclusive would ultimately depend on the number and 
types of rules that a legal system chose to adopt.  But, agency analysis 
demonstrates that instructing a low-ranking subordinate to disobey an order 
when it violates such a disobedience-rule will not result in many mistakes 
because it would not delegate too much discretion to that individual.  
Whether the list would be underinclusive would again depend on the adopted 
rules.  To address this concern, lawmakers should formulate specific rules, 
mainly for orders that violate legal prohibitions that are also core moral 
prohibitions.  Subordinates of all ranks can be required to know such 
                                                                                                                                                       
 300 Mohammed, supra note 8, at 80–81. 
 301 See supra notes 269–71 and accompanying text. 
 302 For example, an Israeli military regulation states that the final decision whether to bomb 
an area from the air, or to abort the mission due to a concern for a disproportional amount of 
civilian casualties, can only be made by the leading pilot in the flight formation.  That is, an 
order cannot be given by higher commanders on the ground to perform the bombing if the 
leading pilot thinks it should be aborted due to the expected amount of civilian casualties.  
This military order is classified; however, its existence was admitted in HCJ 5757/04 Hess v. 
Deputy Chief of Staff, 59(6) PD 97, ¶ 7 [2005] (Isr.).  
 303 See, e.g., Appeal/90/86 Regev v. Chief Military Prosecutor, 1986 PDZ 43, 46 (Isr.) 
(explicitly rejecting an approach that declares certain categories of orders always manifestly 
unlawful, due to the concern that such a policy would be both overinclusive and 
underinclusive). 
 304 Compare e.g., id. (ruling that an order to punish civilians who violated the law without 
the punishment being legally authorized by the judiciary is not an order that should always be 
disobeyed, even if illegal), with Central District Court-Martial/325/82 Military Prosecutor v. 
M. (unpublished) (Isr.); Southern District Court-Martial/248/88 Military Prosecutor v. A. 
(unpublished) (Isr.) (ruling that such illegal orders of extrajudicial punishment should always 
be disobeyed). 
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norms,305 and once clear disobedience-rules are formulated, the likelihood 
that subordinates of any rank will obey orders that violate such rules as a 
conditioned response will be reduced.306  Thus, although it is true that not all 
situations can be contemplated beforehand, setting guidelines ex ante is 
preferable to leaving low-ranking soldiers in the dark, which can often lead 
to acts of conditioned or mistaken obedience, as well as acts of mistaken 
disobedience. 
E.  Protecting Civilians from Harm  
The full list of disobedience-rules will not be identical in all legal 
systems.  Therefore, I will not attempt to formulate a complete list.  In the 
following Part, I will instead attempt to formulate basic norms intended to 
prevent the violation of laws designed to protect civilians from harm.  
1. Rules Applicable in All Emergency Actions 
Most schools of moral thought agree on the importance of protecting 
individuals from physical harm.307  Moreover, as a constitutional matter, the 
domestic civilian population is considered the primary principal in all 
democratic societies.  Therefore, lawmakers are expected to prevent the 
power delegated to military agents from being turned against the civilian 
population.308  Similarly, the core aim of international humanitarian law is to 
protect civilians from the horrors of war.309  Thus, orders that harm civilians 
can be viewed as orders that are extremely harmful to the principal (i.e., 
lawmaker) in the context of both domestic and international law, and a legal 
policy should be formulated to encourage subordinates to disobey, whenever 
possible, orders that are harmful to this aim.   
Yet, a rule instructing soldiers to disobey all orders that cause harm to 
civilians is not plausible.  In emergency situations, allowing the military to 
harm civilians is sometimes both necessary and legal.310  Furthermore, in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 305 See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative requirement 
imposed on military personnel to know moral and legal norms). 
 306 See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (noting that more specific legal rules that 
delineate categories of orders that should be disobeyed will reduce conditioned obedience).  
 307 Re’em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, 131 PHIL. STUD. 369, 372, 388 n.4 (2006).   
 308 Feaver, supra note 173, at 153; see also McNollgast, supra note 186, at 1662 (analyzing 
administrative law in democratic societies from a principal-agent perspective and viewing the 
civilians population as the primary principal).  
 309 Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 56–58 
(2010). 
 310 See, e.g., Olcy Yeúilkaya, International Human Rights Law and Terrorism, in USE OF 
FORCE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 49, 62–63 (M. Uğur Ersen & Çinar Özen ed., 2010) 
(discussing that it is often necessary for the law to give state agents a restricted permission to use 
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many emergency situations, the legality of such an order will depend on 
whether it violates a discretionary legal norm. 
However, we can use this general rule as a template for a more practical 
solution.  For instance, a narrower rule that instructs a soldier to disobey 
orders to intentionally harm civilians would be an appropriate rule, as 
intentionally harming civilians is never justified and is always illegal and 
grossly immoral.311 
We can also construct a rule that instructs subordinates to disobey, even 
in times of emergency, orders that are given without any consideration of the 
harm caused to civilians, or orders given without any attempt to reduce such 
harm.312  Adding this disobedience-rule to the previous rule will increase the 
protection afforded to civilians and reduce a subordinate’s indecision that 
exists when soldiers are faced with a need to ascertain their superior’s 
intentions.313  Yet, because this rule is likely to lead to more mistaken acts of 
disobedience than the previous one, a superior orders defense for reasonable 
mistakes should accompany it, so that subordinates have a limited incentive 
to err on the side of obedience. 
Additionally, disobedience-rules can be formulated by identifying 
specific actions harmful to civilians that are universally agreed never to be 
legal.  Rape, torture, forced pregnancy, forced medical experiments, and 
forced medical treatments that are done for any purpose other than for 
improving patient health are prototypical examples of such acts.314  
                                                                                                                                                       
force against civilians in order to enable them to properly respond to emergency situations). 
 311 An act intentionally harming civilians is viewed as a greater wrong than an act where 
civilians are knowingly harmed in an attempt to achieve another aim.  This moral intuition is 
commonly applied both in criminal law and in international humanitarian law.  PHILLIPA 
FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 22–25 (1978); 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF 
CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 316 (2007). 
 312 The protection of core public aims is often extended to include a duty to consider the risk 
to such aims associated with one’s actions.  See George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal 
Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 402 (1971). 
 313 See id. at 404–05 (stating, in a different context than the one discussed herein, that by 
adopting a presumption that individuals intend the natural and probable consequences of their 
acts the law shifts the “question of intent to an inquiry about the natural and probable 
consequences of acts” which aids in avoiding the difficulties that arise when one attempts to 
ascertain another person’s intent). 
 314 All these acts are prohibited, in both domestic and international law, in both peacetime 
and emergencies.  See, e.g., Blum, supra note 309, at 22–23 (examining torture).  Sometimes, 
elements of these crimes are phrased differently in different contexts.  However, when such 
differences exist, many support a policy that unifies the definitions through interpretation.  For 
a discussion of this policy in the context of torture and murder, see KNUT DÖRMANN, 
ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 44–45 (2003). 
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2.  Use of Force in Emergencies Other Than Armed Conflicts 
Other than the rules just stated, I predict lawmakers will encounter 
difficulties in defining more disobedience-rules that are applicable in all 
emergency situations.  Because military emergencies vary greatly in nature, 
it will often be more efficient to set specific disobedience-rules governing 
different types of emergencies. 
In emergency situations, a law instructing low-ranking subordinates to 
disobey what they suspect are illegal orders will usually not benefit the 
lawmaker, given it delegates an extensive amount of discretion to a less 
capable agent.  But, that is not always the case.  As discussed in the context 
of the mission orders doctrine, a low-ranking subordinate is not always less 
capable of making proper decisions during emergencies.315  Thus, in 
situations where the low-ranking subordinate has more access to the rapidly 
changing situation as it develops, an attempt to assess macro-level concerns 
during the decisionmaking process would not be beneficial.  If the harm from 
the commission of wrongful acts in such a situation can also be expected to 
be uniquely severe, the lawmaker should then give the lower-ranking 
subordinate the discretion to disobey illegal orders.  This conclusion applies 
mostly to situations where force is used against civilians in non-combat 
emergency situations. 
Most schools of moral thought, as well as the actual practice of most legal 
systems, agree that we can only abide the use of force against civilians when 
the decision to use such force is based on an analysis of the concrete, 
individual factors at hand,316 barring macro-level considerations.317  This 
                                                                                                                                                       
 315 See supra Part V.D (discussing orders given in emergency situations). 
 316 See Kurt Andrew Schlichter, Locked and Loaded: Taking Aim at the Growing Use of 
American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1291, 
1302–03, 1308–10 (1993) (comparing when peace officers and the military can use deadly 
force against civilians); Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of 
Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994) (comparing soldiers’ authorization to 
use force against civilians in times of peace versus times of war); Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It 
Necessary to Apply “Physical Pressure” to Terrorists—And to Lie about It?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 
192, 197 (1989) (“The necessity defense is by its very nature an emergency measure; it is not 
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note 70, at 795–96 (explaining why the necessity defense should be limited to times of 
“imminent risk”).  The explanations given for how emergency norms are formulated differ 
between jurists, depending on the moral view they hold.  Yet, despite this plurality of 
opinions, there is a strong consensus concerning the way legal permissions to use force against 
civilians in emergencies should be formulated.  This consensus is of course not absolute 
because this issue raises complex moral dilemmas.  But, this consensus is expressed 
extensively in moral theory and even more so in legal practice.  As such, it should serve as the 
basis for formulating legal norms. 
 317 ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 226, at 56, 155–56; FLETCHER, supra note 70, at 
795; Tanya R. Ward, Act-Consequentialism and Permitting Too Much, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
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consensus on the use of a case-specific analysis should serve as the basis for 
formulating legal rules.318  When viewed alongside the rationale behind the 
mission orders doctrine, it follows that in situations where civilians could be 
harmed, discretion should be allotted to the soldier on the field, regardless of 
that soldier’s rank.319  
However, one should not conclude that commanders should never be 
allowed to determine when and how much force can be used.  If a 
commander in the field gives a lower-ranking soldier the order, it is 
appropriate to encourage the lower-ranking soldier to obey.  To do otherwise 
would unnecessarily increase mistakes.  
Thus, a legal rule can be formulated for those situations where orders are 
given to use force in a non-combat emergency.  With the exception of orders 
given face-to-face in the field, all such orders should be disobeyed if they 
prevent subordinates from making more concrete assessments regarding 
when and how much force should be used.320  Moreover, this rule can easily 
be divided into several clearer sub-rules governing non-combat emergency 
situations.  First, any order given ex ante, or by a commander away from the 
field, cannot forbid subordinates from exercising their own discretion in 
assessing the necessity of using force.321  Second, any order to use force 
against civilians that is not given in response to an immediate situation 
should be disobeyed, even if given face-to-face.  Accordingly, orders given 
by a commander to use force as punishment for a civilian’s past acts or to 
deter a civilian from committing future acts should be disobeyed.322  
                                                                                                                                                       
FRONTIERS 151, 154–56 (Richard H. Corrigan & Mary E. Farrell eds., 2008) (arguing the 
moral demand to assess long-term effects of an action depends on the extent in which we can 
reasonably expect the relevant agent to be able to assess such effects with sufficient accuracy);  
Re’em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness in the Distribution of Scarce Health Resources, 30 J. 
MED. & PHIL. 231, 241 (2005) (“[I]n resolving specific conflicts, the overall state of well-
being might seem too detached, since it is comprised of actors that would often have nothing 
to do with the conflict at hand . . . .”). 
 318 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 158–61, 165, 171 (1993), and FLETCHER, supra 
note 311, at 66–67 (discussing the moral significance of formulating legal norms based on an 
“overlapping consensus”). 
 319 For the current implications of this consensus on the rules of engagement for soldiers 
engaged in emergencies other than armed conflicts, see, e.g., Schlichter, supra note 316, at 
1303–06; Martins, supra note 316, at 27; Thomas R. Lujan, Legal Aspects of Domestic 
Employment of the Army, 27 PARAMETERS 82, 88, 93–95 (1997). 
 320 A similar rule already exists in many legal systems. According to this rule, in all 
emergencies other than armed conflicts, the use of force ”must be justified by the necessity of 
the situation, and does not become legal by reason of the decision to call in the troops.”  A.W. 
BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 627 (15th ed. 2011); 
see also Charles R. Murray, Civil Disturbance, Justifiable Homicide and Military Law, 54 
MIL. L. REV. 129, 153, 157 (1971).  
 321 Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 392, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911); McLaughin v. Ministry 
of Defense, [1978] N.I.J.B. (No. 7) at 11–12 [hereinafter McLaughin]. 
 322 Southern District Court-Martial/248/88 Military Prosecutor v. A. (unpublished) (Isr.); 
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These rules can be easily taught and implemented.  Furthermore, such 
rules create a division of labor similar to the one suggested by the mission 
orders doctrine; assessments of macro-level factors should be made by 
higher-ranking superiors, while on-the-spot assessments should be left to 
those in the field.323  
3.  Use of Force in Armed Conflicts 
A different solution must be formulated for orders that authorize the use 
of force against civilians during armed conflicts.  The main norm regulating 
this issue during armed conflicts is international humanitarian law’s 
prohibition against disproportional attacks. Harming civilians is legal,324 but 
only if it is incidental to an attack on a military target and not clearly 
excessive in relation to the military advantage attained by attacking the 
military target.325  Unlike the norms that deal with the use of force against 
civilians in other emergencies, international humanitarian law’s 
proportionality norm does not demand a concrete, act-specific assessment.326 
Notwithstanding differences in the interpretation of the proportionality 
requirement,327 there is a general consensus that the military advantage328 
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 323 See supra Part V.D; see also Farrell v. Secretary of State for Defense [1980] 1 Eng. Rep. 
166, 172 (appeal taken from Northern Ireland) (requiring soldiers on the field to use 
reasonableness in executing military plans); McLaughin, supra note 321, at 7–8 
(demonstrating a soldier’s responsibility to make a reasonableness assessment when 
conducting security operations); McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 69, 73 (1861). 
 324 The prohibition against disproportional attack applies also to civilian property damage.  I 
do not, however, think the rules set herein for low-ranking subordinates should be applicable 
when property damage is contemplated.  First, it is commonly accepted that less protection 
can be afforded to property than to human life.  E.g., FLETCHER, supra note 70, at 779.  
Second, whether a particular property is a legitimate target is determined by the military 
advantage to be had in targeting that property.  DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 84–86.  Thus, the 
status of property is often temporal, and much less clear than the status of individuals.  
Moreover, this makes the relevant assessment one that low-ranking soldiers are ill-equipped to 
make.  See Wasserstrom, supra note 137, at 202 (asserting that the determination of issues of 
military necessity is too difficult a task to place on lower ranked soldiers). 
 325 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(2)(iv). 
 326 For a discussion of this difference as it affects the instructions given to soldiers 
concerning the use of force, see Schlichter, supra note 316, at 1302–03, 1308–10; Martins, 
supra note 316, at 27.  See also Blum, supra note 309, at 40–44 (discussing the difference 
between the “lesser of evils” balance that should be made in IHL and in domestic law).  
 327 Hamutal E. Shamash, How Much Is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of Jus 
in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 103, 107 (2006).  
 328 A military advantage is attained when the military object attacked has an effective 
contribution to the enemy’s military operation.  1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 
4, at 29.  According to a commonly held view, the assessment of “the anticipated military 
advantage can [also] include increased security for the attacking forces or friendly forces.”  1 
id. at 31. 
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needs to be assessed in relation to the “attack as a whole.”  That is, on the 
one hand, the assessment of the expected advantage should not be done in 
relation to the whole conflict; on the other hand, it should not be assessed 
“bullet by bullet.”329  Instead, it needs to be made in relation to the current 
tactical operation as well as to several tactical operations that are connected 
to that operation.  Usually only division commanders and higher-ranking 
soldiers can be expected to properly make such an assessment.330  This 
makes it difficult to demand that lower-ranking soldiers make an 
independent assessment of proportionality, and such a legal demand would 
likely cause many mistakes.331  
The problem with demanding low-ranking subordinates to make 
independent proportionality assessments has led scholars to support one of 
two views.  First, some scholars claim the rule prohibiting disproportional 
attacks should be interpreted as addressing only commanders of a 
sufficiently high rank.332  Others think this prohibition is addressed to all 
soldiers.  However, they acknowledge the problem that arises if all soldiers 
are asked to make such assessments, and therefore argue that low-ranking 
soldiers should only be required to “be thoroughly aware, [when] carrying 
out [their] task, of [their] basic obligation to spare the civilian population as 
much as possible.”333  Yet, both of these views are problematic in the context 
of acts committed under orders.  
Requiring only high-ranking commanders to make the proportionality 
assessment causes two problems.  First, this course of action does not take 
advantage of a lawmaker’s ability to deter commanders by targeting 
subordinates for criminal liability while offering them an opportunity to 
escape punishment in exchange for implicating their superiors, through the 
use of a superior orders defense.  Second, this position ignores that even low-
ranking soldiers are sometimes afforded discretion in the orders given to 
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them, and if such discretion is given, even low-ranking soldiers should be 
obligated to spare civilians as much as possible. 
The second view is also flawed.  Commanders do not always give low-
ranking subordinates discretion in how to fulfill their orders.  In such 
situations, demanding a low-ranking subordinate to disobey whenever she 
disagrees with her superior’s proportionality assessment has the strong 
potential to severely increase mistakes.  
An intermediate solution should thus be adopted.  A low-ranking 
subordinate should be placed, within the limits of the discretion left to her 
after being given an order, under the duty to spare the civilian population as 
much as possible.  And, when a subordinate clearly has not done so, it is 
appropriate to punish her.  Furthermore, to reduce the probability that a 
subordinate and a commander will disagree on the extent of discretion an 
order affords the subordinate, a presumption of discretion should be applied.  
This presumption would be that, unless clearly stated otherwise by the 
commander, a subordinate should assume the order preserved her discretion 
to act in a certain way during the performance of the task ordered, if acting in 
such a way is needed to protect civilians.334  This presumption has several 
advantages.  First, it encourages commanders to give explicit orders, which 
reduces the ability of commanders to use vaguely phrased orders as a way to 
allege, after the fact, they had no hand in the illegal acts of their 
subordinates.335  Subordinates will also be better equipped to recognize 
whether an order violates the disobedience-rules discussed earlier (e.g., 
whether the motive behind the order is to intentionally harm civilians).  
Secondly, this presumption serves as a substitute for a common professional 
perspective.336  If both subordinates and superiors are instructed to interpret 
orders with this presumption in mind, it will reduce the likelihood they will 
interpret an order differently.  While this presumption is imperfect, it is 
preferable to the currently used conditional liability approaches.  Soldiers 
often do not take the time to critically examine the legality or morality of an 
order when they are in emergency situations and simply obey.337  This 
presumption does not represent a perfect solution to this soldiers’ tendency, 
but because it informs subordinates they have a unique responsibility with 
regard to the specific issue of protecting civilians from harm, it is less likely 
to create a tendency for conditioned obedience to horrific, illegal orders 
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compared to a more general instruction (such as an instruction to disobey all 
illegal orders or an instruction to disobey all grossly immoral illegal orders). 
To further prevent low-ranking subordinates from committing crimes of 
obedience during armed conflicts, specific disobedience-rules should be set 
that prohibit the commission of certain acts during armed conflicts.  The 
main source for such rules should be the penal prohibitions of international 
humanitarian law.338  Moreover, by addressing the disobedience-rules that 
should be formulated based in these prohibitions, the legal policy 
international law should adopt can be further uncovered.  
Until this point, the Article has assumed that domestic legal standards 
should track those applied in the realm of international law.339  However, it is 
important to stress that domestic legal systems can, and should, be allowed to 
treat their own war criminals more harshly than they would be treated under 
the international rules suggested herein for armed conflicts.  As discussed 
earlier, states should not be allowed to be inconsistent in the way they treat 
foreign soldiers who commit crimes of obedience.340  Nothing prevents a 
state, however, from affording its own soldiers a less extensive defense than 
the one suggested herein,341 and doing so would be appropriate if a state 
could expect a low-ranking soldiers’ knowledge of international 
humanitarian law to be more extensive than assumed in this Article.  Thus, 
the disobedience-rules that will now be discussed for armed conflicts suggest 
only the minimum that should be accepted by all states.342  States can and 
should seek to apply a higher standard to their own soldiers where possible. 
One step that should be taken in light of the rationales of international 
humanitarian law is to extend the disobedience-rules already formulated 
herein, as they apply in armed conflicts, to prevent harm to all categories of 
protected persons, not just civilians.  Doing so is consistent with international 
humanitarian law, which extends to such persons the same protections that 
are afforded to civilians.343  
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Yet, other than this general policy, which specific prohibitions of 
international humanitarian law should serve as bases for additional 
disobedience-rules?  Two main rationales should guide us: (1) the clarity of 
the relevant prohibition; and (2) the moral significance of the aim protected 
by the prohibition.  When these rationales exist, we can assume that soldiers 
are likely to be able to correctly recognize such orders,344 and the harm that 
will be caused if such crimes of obedience are allowed is high.  
Thus, clear prohibitions of international humanitarian law that intend to 
safeguard civilians or other protected persons should serve as the basis for 
disobedience-rules.  Accordingly, subordinates of all ranks should be 
instructed to disobey orders that: (1) are intended to force protected persons 
to serve in hostile armies; (2) are intended to compel foreign nationals to take 
part in war operations directed at their own country; (3) demand pillaging; or 
(4) demand taking hostages. 
What about the prohibitions against genocide and crimes against 
humanity? Such acts have the potential to cause extensive, severe, and 
morally reprehensible harm to the physical wellbeing of civilians.345  The 
harm from mistaken acts of disobedience that might be caused by 
disobedience-rules that tell soldiers to disobey such orders will often pale in 
comparison to the harm wrought by genocide and crimes against humanity.  
Thus, strong support exists for rejecting the applicability of any superior 
orders defense in the context of orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity.346  The problem, however, with adopting such a policy is that it is 
difficult to view each and every participant in such acts as morally 
blameworthy, because, sometimes, low-ranking subordinates will not be able 
to recognize the act they are ordered to perform is part of a crime against 
humanity or genocide.  Therefore, to completely reject the applicability of 
the superior orders defense in the context of such crimes is inappropriate.347  
That is not to say, however, that low-ranking subordinates should have a 
duty to obey such orders.  The policy suggested thus far offers a solution to 
this problem.  In the context of low-ranking subordinates, the disobedience-
rules suggested in this article thus far that intend to safeguard civilians from 
harm are able to strongly aid in the prevention of crimes against humanity 
and genocide.  At the same time they provide clearer guidance to 
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subordinates, and thus take into account the relevant excusatory 
considerations.  
In international humanitarian law, however, additional penal prohibitions 
exist that attempt to advance public aims other than securing protected 
persons’ safety; namely preventing unnecessary suffering of combatants and 
regulating interaction between belligerents.348  Should these prohibitions 
serve as the basis for the formulation of disobedience-rules?  Many of these 
norms are phrased technically, such as those that list which weapons are 
prohibited, and therefore, low-ranking subordinates cannot be expected to 
know all of them.349  Moreover, since intentional suffering of soldiers is 
allowed and considered a legitimate public aim during an armed conflict, it is 
clear that the significance of the aim protected by such norms is weaker.  
Thus, low-ranking subordinates should not be expected to disobey illegal 
orders that violate such prohibitions and a superior orders defense should be 
afforded when they do so.  
With that said, it should be acknowledged that it is impossible to create a 
completely clear boundary separating prohibitions intended to protect non-
combatants from those that regulate hostile parties.350  Thus, to avoid an 
underinclusive legal policy, bright-line prohibitions that regulate those issues 
found on the border between these two sub-categories of international 
humanitarian law should be used as sources for additional disobedience-
rules. Soldiers should thus be instructed to disobey: (1) orders to physically 
harm a combatant who has surrendered, or who has been wounded to the 
extent that she cannot continue to participate in the fighting; as well as any 
other orders that would deny quarter from a hors de combat (2) orders to 
wear civilian clothes either during combat or in close proximity to an area 
where combat is expected to occur; (3) orders to wear the uniforms or the 
insignia of other protected persons; (4) orders to use signals of surrender 
when surrender is not intended; and (6) orders to poison food and water 
supplies.  
In sum, the discussion made in the current subsection, when viewed in 
light of the conclusions reached previously, uncovers the main norms that 
should guide international law’s policy regarding crimes of obedience.  
Certain illegal orders, mainly those that violate core prohibitions intended to 
safeguard civilians and other protected persons, should be disobeyed by all, 
even low-ranking, soldiers.  But, as to orders that violate other legal norms, 
low-ranking soldiers should be allowed to obey those orders and be afforded 
a superior orders defense when they do.  High-ranking subordinates, on the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 348 FRÉDÉRIC DE MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED FORCES 3–4 (1989).  
 349 Wasserstrom, supra note 137, at 202–03; LESLIE C. GREEN, What Is—Why Is There—the 
Law of War?, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 1, 34 (2d ed. 1999). 
 350  DE MULINEN, supra note 348, at 3–4.  
2012] THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE 73 
other hand, should be obligated to disobey all illegal orders and should only 
enjoy a superior orders defense for acts of obedience committed due to 
reasonable mistakes.  Moreover, if they are members of the “General Staff,” 
they should never enjoy a superior orders defense.  Such a policy affords 
extensive protection against crimes of obedience, while reducing 
inconsistency and uncertainty.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The issue of obedience to illegal military orders has long been a core 
issue in international criminal law, due to the fact that many, if not most, war 
crimes are crimes of obedience.  This issue is also a cardinal one for 
domestic legal systems because obedience to orders is the backbone of any 
military.  Yet, despite the core importance of this issue in both domestic and 
international law, the law on the subject remains unclear and disputed.  In 
light of the failure of both international and domestic legal systems to fairly 
and efficiently address this legal issue, this Article has used agency analysis 
to show that none of the currently supported approaches is appropriate when 
applied in every scenario.  Accordingly, a combination of approaches should 
be adopted depending on the individual factors in any given situation.  The 
law should apply different approaches depending on the rank of the 
subordinate and whether the order is given in an emergency situation. 
Even though this policy will cause low-ranking subordinates to 
knowingly obey some illegal orders during emergencies, this result can be 
justified both by the severe harm that might be caused if low-ranking 
subordinates were forced to review the legality of all orders in times of 
emergency and also by the strong excusatory considerations that exist in such 
cases.  Additionally, this policy still provides extensive protection against the 
harms that might be caused by crimes of obedience by: (1) vesting high-
ranking subordinates with a duty to obey only legal orders, even in times of 
emergency; (2) encouraging low-ranking soldiers who obey illegal orders to 
implicate their superiors by affording them a superior orders defense; and (3) 
setting core disobedience-rules that are applicable even to low-ranking 
subordinates in emergencies.  
The formulation of this model legal policy can thus serve as a resource 
for lawmakers who wish to reform the law of obedience to illegal orders.  
Moreover, this model legal policy shows that regulating the issue in a 
modular way can release lawmakers and soldiers from the harm inflicted by 
the archaic premise that the same approach should regulate the issue of 
obedience to orders at all times.  Thus, in light of the debt owed to those who 
are ready to sacrifice their liberty and lives for their countries, as well as the 
need to maintain both military efficiency and crime prevention, the current 
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unattainable quest for a proper one-rule-fits-all policy must be abandoned in 
favor of a modular approach. 
